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Judicial Rationales in Insurance Law: Dusting Off
the Formal for the Function
PETER NASH SWISHER*
Judicial opinions [in insurance law] are less than ordinarily enlightening
about principled bases for decision. Often . . . the favorite generalization
advanced by outside observers to explain a judgment against an insurance
company at variance with policy provisions is the ambivalent, suggestive, and
wholly unsatisfactory aphorism: "It's an insurance case."
-Professor [now Judge] Robert E. Keeton
BASIC TEXT ON INSURANCE LAW 341 (1971)
Disinterested legal doctrinal analysis of the traditional kind remains the
indispensible core of legal thought, and there is no surfeit of such analysis
today. I daresay that many legal scholars who today are breathing the heady
fumes of deconstruction, structuralism, moral philosophy, and the theory of
second best would be better employed... synthesizing the law of insurance.
-Professor [now Judge] Richard A. Posner
7he Decline of Law as an Autonomous Discipline: 1962-1987, 100 HARV.

L. REV. 761, 777 (1987)

You knew the law, Portia. But you didn't know the judge.
-RUMPOLE OF THE BAILEY
PBS Television

* Professor of Law, University of Richmond Law School; B.A. Amherst College,
1966; M.A. Stanford University, 1967; J.D. University of California, Hastings College of
the Law, 1973. Member of the California and Virginia State Bars.
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I. INTRODUCTON
Many decisional patterns in insurance law cases are very difficult to
understand, and the judicial rationales underlying these conflicting decisions are
seldom expressly stated.
Indeed, one writer has suggested that insurance contract cases "frequently
read like a chapter out of Alice in Wonderland,"1 and two other authors write:
'Welcome to the wonderful world of Insurance. In it the rules of law of
Contracts are reflected as in a fun house mirror." 2 Even Professor Keeton
admits that the underlying justifications for many insurance law cases '%re less
3
than ordinarily enlightening."
The purpose of this Article is to demonstrate that there is indeed a great
deal of method within this apparent judicial 'hiadness" if one properly
understands and appreciates the two competing theories of Judicial Formalism
versus Judicial Functionalism in an insurance law context. And with a proper
understanding of these two competing judicial theories, numerous apparent
inconsistencies in insurance law decisions may be reconciled within each
particular theoretical framework.
Accordingly, this Article will present a general overview of these two
competing theories of American jurisprudence, and then discuss their
conflicting applications in various insurance law decisions by utilizing a
number of specific insurance law examples for illustrative purposes.
The central theme of this Article is that, in an insurance law context at
least, Legal Formalism today is far from a dead issue and may in fact be in a
resurgence, while Legal Functionalism, as exemplified by the "doctrine of
reasonable expectations," may be experiencing a more limited application in
many courts today than various commentators had originally predicted. The
resulting conclusion of this Article, therefore, is that it is not enough to know
the law of insurance. One must also know the judge.

I J. DOBBYN, INSURANCE LAW IN A NUTsHELL xix (1981).
2 K. YORK & J. WHELAN, INSURANCE LAW: CASES, MATERIALS

AND PROBLEMS

xv (1982).
3 R. KEErON, BASIC TExT ON INSURANCE LAW 341 (1971). See also R. KEETON &
A. WIDISS, INSURANCE LAW 614-16 (1988); infra note 52.
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II. THE TWO COMPETING THEORIES OF AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE

A. Legal Fonnalismversus Legal Functionalism An Overview
Legal Formalism, 4 also known as Legal Positivism, 5 is a school of
jurisprudence first identified with the English philosopher John Austin 6 and

later embraced by American judicial scholars such as Christopher Columbus

8
Langdell 7 and Joseph Henry Beale.

Of major importance to American contract law in general, and to American
insurance law in particular, was the fact that Legal Formalism was also
embraced by the eminent American authority on the law of contracts, Samuel
Williston.

9

4

Legal Formalism is difficult to define because, so far as I can tell, no one ever
developed and defended a systematic body of doctrines that would answer to that
nam..... [But] [p]art of what is meant by formalism is this: The law provides a

sufficient basis for deciding any case that arises. There are no 'gaps' within the
law, and there is but one sound legal decision for each case. The law is complete
and univocal ....
Lyons, Legal Formalism and Inswnentalism-A PathologicalStudy, 66 CORNELL L. REV.
949, 950 (1981).
5 See, e.g., Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 HARV. L.
REV. 593 (1958); Fuller, Positivism andFidelity to Law, 71 HARv. L. REV. 630 (1958).
6 Austin's major thesis was that a legal system is a collection of laws emanating from
a sovereign power and such laws, regardless of their social or moral consequence, are still
valid if enacted in due form.
"The existence of law is one thing; its merit or demerit is another." Austin continues,
"A law, which actually exists, is a law, though we happen to dislike it."J. AUSTIN, THE
PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DErERMINED 46-47 (1832); see also J. AUSTIN, LECTURES
ON JURISPRUDENCE: OR THE PHILOSOPHY OF PosrrlvE LAW (1863).
7 See, e.g., Langdell, Teaching Law as a Science, 21 AM. L. REV. 123 (1887), 3

LAWQ. REV. 123 (1887).
Langdell, Dean and Professor of Law at Harvard Law School from 1870 to 1895, was
the primary originator of the "casebook"method and the "socratic"method for teaching law,
which is still found in most American law schools today.
8 See, e.g., J. BEALE, A TREATISE ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS (1935).
9 See, e.g., S. WILLISTON, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS (1920); see also S.
WILLISTON, LIFE AND LAW: AN AUTOBIOGRAPHY (1940).
Undei the contractual interpretive approach of Professor Williston, extrinsic evidence
relating to a contract in general, and to an insurance contract in particular, may be
examined for the purpose of determining a document's meaning only if the language of that
document is unclear; otherwise the court is limited in determining the parties' intention to an
objective analysis of the "four corners" of the contract. See, e.g., R. JERRY,
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Generally speaking, Legal Formalism is the traditional view that correct
legal decisions are determined by pre-existing legal precedent, and the courts

must reach their decisions solely based upon logical deduction, applying the
facts of a particular case to a set of pre-exisiting legal rules. Under this

Formalistic legal theory, the law is viewed as a complete and'autonomous
system of logical principles and rules. The judge's techniques must therefore be

socially neutral, and his or her private views or philosophy is irrelevant.
Judging under this formalistic theory is thus a matter of logical necessity rather
10
than a matter of choice.
For example, Professor Langdell, as a representative Legal Formalist,"
believed that the law was a science consisting of logical principles and rules,
and he further believed that fundamental legal doctrine only grew by a slow
evolutionary process that was traceable to a relatively small number of legal
decisions. 12 Langdell thus maintained that all sources of the law are "contained

in printed books," 13 and therefore "the library is the proper workshop of [law]
professors and students alike ... it is to us all that the laboratories ... are to
the chemists and physicists, all that the museum of natural history is to the
4
zoologists, all that the botanical garden is the botanists."1

This autonomous theory of the law as logically applied by the Legal
Formalists, however, was not without its critics. Oliver Wendell Holmes, for
example, in 1881 stated that "the life of the law has not been logic: it has been

UNDERSTANDING INSURANCE LAW 98-99 (1987); see also infra notes 31-32, 36-38 and
accompanying text.
10 See, e.g., G.W. PATON, A TEXTBOOK OF JURiSPRUDENCE 3-14 (Derham 4th ed.
1972).
11
Despite important differences between Austin and Langdell, they were, in a sense,
spiritually closer to each other than either was to the [Legal Functionalists]. Both
men presumed that principles exist which provide a complete map of the law.
They assumed that law has an underlying unity of doctrine that can be mastered
by the right kind of [logical] approach.
Rumble, The Legal Positivism of John Austin and the Realist Movement in American
Jurisprudence,66 CORNELLL. REV. 986, 1004 n.87 (1981).
12 Langdell claimed, for example, that "[tihe vast majority of Uudicial cases] are
useless, and worse than useless, for any purpose of systematic study." C. LANGDELL, A
SELEMrTON OF CASES ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS vi (1871).
13 Langdell, supra note 7, at 123.
14 C. Langdell, Commemorative Speech at Harvard College, reprinted in A.
SUTHERLAND, THE LAW AT HARVARD: A HISTORY OF IDEAS AND MEN 1817-1967 at
175 (1967).
For a more comprehensive overview and analysis of Langdell's Formalist legal
philosophy, see generally Grey, Langdell's Orthodoxy, 45 U. Prrr. L. REV. 1 (1983);
Speziale, Langdell's Concept ofLmv as Science, 5 VT. L. REV. 1 (1980).
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experience." 15 Moreover, Roscoe Pound argued in 1910 that Langdell's view

16
of the law "in the books"often was not the same as the law "in action."
Thus, there emerged a countervailing school of thought in American
jurisprudence, which has alternately been labelled Legal Realism, 17 Pragmatic
19
Instrumentalism, 18 or Legal Functionalism.
15

O.W. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAw 1 (1881). But see TWINING & MIERS, How

TO Do THINGS wrrH RULES 141 (1976) ("even a cursory reading of Holmes reveals that he

was concerned to show that logic is only one of a number of factors in 'determining the
rules by which men should be governed'.... )
By "logic" Holmes indicated that he meant the logical syllogisms and corollaries of
Legal Formalism, and by "experience" he meant considerations of what was socially
expedient in the real world. To Holmes, even the Constitution was "an experiment, as all
life is an experiment."Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919).
For a more comprehensive overview and analysis of Holmes' legal philosophy, see
generally Grey, Holmes and Legal Pragmatism, 41 STAN. L. REV. 787 (1989); H.L.
POHLMAN, JUSTICE OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES AND UTILrrARIAN JURISPRUDENCE

(1984).
16 Pound, Lmv in Books and Law in Action, 44 AM. L. REV. 12 (1910).
Both Holmes and Pound were "particularly vigorous in their condemnation of those
judges of the federal and state supreme courts who invalidated social legislation partly on
the ground that the 'logic' of such very general constitutional conceptions as liberty of
contract and substantive due process dictated that outcome." Summers, Pragmatic
lnstranentalismin Twentieth Century American Legal 7Thought, 66 CORNELL L. REV. 861,
868-69 (1981).
For a more comprehensive analysis of Pound's legal philosophy, see generally R.
POUND, JURISPRUDENCE (1959).
17
Although the term "Legal Realism"is still widely used to encompass the entire body
of ideas of this uniquely American school of jurisprudence, it is more technically applied to
the legal theorists of the 1920s and 1930s. See generally W. RUMBLE, AMERICAN LEGAL
REALISM (1968). Also, the term "Legal Realism"has not been regularly used to refer to the
most current theory of sociological jurisprudence alternately referred to as "Legal
Pragmatism" or "Pragmatic Instrumentalism." See, e.g., Summers, supra note 16, at 685
n.2; see also infra note 18 and accompanying text.
Nevertheless, Paton and Derham have generically referred to this "sociological" school
of American jurisprudence as "The Functional School," and, for the sake of definitional
simplification, so shall I. See generally Paton, supra note 10, at 22-36.
18 See generally R. SUMMERS, INSTRUMENTALISM AND AMERICAN LEGAL THEORY
(1982); Farber, Legal Pragnatisn and the Constitution, 72 MINN. L. REV. 1331 (1988);
Moore, The Need for a 7heory ofLegal Theories: Assessing PragmaticInstrunentalism, 69
CORNELL L. REV. 988 (1984); Stainsky, The Possibility ofLegal Change: Pragmatismand
Legal Theory, 46 U. TORONTO L. REV. 456 (1988); Summers, supra note 16.
19 Again, for the purpose of simplification within this Article, I shall include both
Legal Realism and Legal Pragmatism under the term Legal Functionalism as a very broad
generic concept of sociological jurisprudence.
For influential works in this Functionalist field of American sociological jurisprudence
see generally F. COHEN, THE LEGAL CONSCIENCE (1960); K. LLEwELLYN,
JURISPRUDENCE: REALISM AND THEORY IN PRACTICE (1962); R. POUND,
JURISPRUDENCE (1959); W. RUMBLE, AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM (1968); R. SUMMERS,
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How do Legal Formalism and Legal Functionalism differ? First, Legal

Formalism

is logically-based

and precedent-oriented,

whereas

Legal

Functionalism is sociologically-based and result-oriented.
For example, one Legal Formalist defined a formalist judicial approach in
this manner:
It is not the duty of our courts to be leaders in reform... The judge is always
confined within the narrow limits of reasonable interpretation. It is not his
function or within his power to enlarge or improve the law [since that is the
function of the legislature]. His duty is to maintain it, to enforce it, whether it
is good or bad, wise or foolish . . . [Thus] our courts are excluded from
playing the part of reformer. Their duty is to interpret the law as it is, in
sincerity and truth, under the sanction of their oaths and in the spirit of

justice. 20

INSTRUMENTALISM AND AMERICAN LEGAL THEORY (1982); W. TWINING, KARL
LLEWELLYN AND THE REALIST MOVEMENT (1973).

The most consistent and comprehensive response to the many claims of Legal Realism
has been made by Professor Ronald Dworkin in his classic works R. DWORKIN, TAKING
RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1977); R. DWORKIN, A MATrER OF PRINCIPLE (1985); R. DWORKIN,
LAW'S EMPIRE (1986). Dworkin's works have also influenced other post-Realist legal
theorists. See, e.g., M. SANDEL, LIBERALISM AND rrs CRITCS (M. Sandel ed. 1984); B.
ACKERMAN, RECONSTRUCTING AMERICAN LAW (1984); see also Altman, Legal Realism,
CriticalLegal Studies, and hvorkin, 15 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 205 (1986).
There is still another school of American legal theory, the Critical Legal Studies
Movement, which generally calls for the dismantling of existing political and legal
institutions in favor of newly empowered forms of social democracy. See; e.g., M.
KELMAN, A GUIDE TO CRrrICAL LEGAL STUDIES (1987); THE POLITICS OF LAW: A
PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE (D. Kairys, ed. 1982); R. UNGER, THE CRITcAL LEGAL
STUDIES MOVEMENT (1986); see also White, From Realism to CriticalLegal Studies: A
Truncated IntellectualHistory, 40 Sw. U.L. REV. 819 (1986).
For critical comment regarding Critical Legal Studies, see, e.g., Dowd, CriticalLegal
Studies: Beyond Skeptical Jurisprudence, 11 J. CONTEMP. L. 345 (1984); Ewald, Unger's
Philosophy: A Critical Legal Study, 97 YALE L.J. 665 (1988). See also A. ALTMAN,
CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES: A LIBERAL CRITIQUE (1990); Comment, 'Round and 'Round

the Bramble Bush: From Legal Realism to CriticalLegal Sdolarship, 95 HARV. L. REV.
1669 (1982).
20 Root, The Importance of an Independent Judiciary, 72 THE INDEPENDENT 704
(1912). At this time "the overwhelming majority of lawyers and judges provided
unquestioning endorsement" to this legal philosophy. See, e.g. G. AICHELE, LEGAL
REALISM AND TWENTErH CENTURY AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE 10, (1990); see also

United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 63 (1936) ("This Court neither approves or condemns
any legislative policy. Its delicate and difficult office is to ascertain and declare whether the
legislation is in accordance with, or in contravention of, the provisions of the Constitution;
and having done that, its duty ends.")
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The Legal Functionalists, on the other hand, believe that the Formalistic
theory of logical, socially-neutral, legal "certainty" is rarely attainable, 21 and
perhaps undesirable in a changing society, and that the paramount concern of
the law should not be logical consistency, as the Formalists believed, but
socially desirable consequences:
Insofar as formalists and conservative theorists at the turn of the century did
recognize proposals for genuinely new law, they often assumed that these
proposals should be judged primarily by how well they meshed with existing
law. Consistency, analogy, coherence, harmony, and symmetry were their
main tests of soundness. The [functionalists] rejected this view. They did not
look to the past and ask: Is this proposal consistent with X? Analogous to Y?
Harmonious with Z? Rather, they looked forward and asked: What can now be
done to alter the future? What substantive goals, derived from popular wants
and interests, are relevant? What rules or other precepts are required to further
them? Thus, the [functionalist] theorists subscribed to a substantive means-goal
22
rationality.
21 Indeed, one author argues that Legal Formalism, as a system of judicial rules, was

never really "socially neutral" at all, but was rather a judicial support system for a political
ideology that favored certain social and political ideas over other ideas. See, e.g., Goetsch,
The Future ofLegal Fonnalism,24 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 221 (1980).
22 Summers, supra note 16, at 890. Professor Summers also presents twelve
additional factors that separate Legal Formalists from Legal Functionalists:

CONTRASTS OF FORMALISTIC AND [FUNCTIONALISTIC] VIEWS
CONTEXT

FORMALISTIC VIEW

[FUNCTIONALISTIC] VIEW

1. ambit of
legal creativity
and legal change

scope narrow; law is
like a static and
closed logical system

scope wide; law is
like a dynamic
and open
framework

2. judicial power
to make law

due to separation of
powers, judges may only
discover, declare, and
apply the law as it
already exists

judges have power
to make law, and
regularly do so,
covertly as well
as overtly

3. responsibility
of Supreme
Court to test
Constitutionality
of legislation

responsibility broad
legislation at least
presumptively invalid
if it conflicts with
literal text of constitutional phrase

responsibility
narrow; legislation
presumptively valid
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4. whether there
is a single perfect
form of law as a
solution to each
problem

always one "true rule"
ascertainable by
reason ...

plurality of
plausible forms of
law for the usual
problem

5. considerations
relevant in lawmaking

coherence, harmony,
and consistency
with existing law

social facts and
existing wants and
interests

6. tests for
identifying valid
forms of law

whether law is
traceable to an
authoritative
source

whether law has a
defensible substantive content

7. nature of
reality of valid
law

general rules
"in books"

predictable law.
"in action"

8. structure of
valid law within
a field

reducible to a unitary
general theory, as in
science

pluralistic and
irreducible

9. correct
statement of
valid law

susceptible to statement only in a limited
number of abstract and
wide generalizations

susceptible to
statement only in
many concrete and
narrow generalizations

10. interpretation
and application of
case law

words of opinion and
"logic"control

judge's action in
light of facts controls

11. interpretation
and application of
written law

authoritative language
and "logic"of the
concepts expressed
controls

goals of lawmaker
infuse the language
and these together
control

12. elaboration
and extension of
existing law

"logic"of existing
concepts controls

"policy"controls

Id. at 867-68 n.4.
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Based upon these result-oriented and sociologically-based tenets, Legal
Functionalism is now recognized as the dominant legal theory of American

jurisprudence today.23
But if Legal Functionalism is now so well-entrenched within American
jurisprudence 4-at least in the academic community--do we need any longer
to recognize the impact of traditional Legal Formalism in American judicial
decisionmaking today?
The answer is that Legal Formalism, as a theory of American
jurisprudence and as a framework for judicial decisionmaking, is far from a
26
dead issue, and in fact seems to be enjoying a remarkable resurgence.
Equally important is the current impact of Legal Formalism on members of the
state and federal judiciary:
Not since the late 1920s and 1930s has there been such widespread interest in
American jurisprudence. But it is no longer the [Legal Functionalists] who are
challenging established norms. The victories at the polls of political
conservatives like Richard Nixon and Ronald Reagan [and George Bush], and
the corresponding ideological commitments of many recent appointments to the
federal bench, now threaten the continued prominence of a theory of judicial
interpretation first articulated and advanced by the [Legal Functionalists].
Impossible only a decade ago, "mechanical jurisprudence" has made a

remarkable comeback, and a new Legal Formalism may yet triumph as the
principal mode of [judicial] interpretation ....27

23 See generally G. AIcHELE, supra note 20; see also supra notes 17-19 and
accompanying text.
24 See, e.g., supranotes 17-19, 22-23 and accompanying text.
25 For an interesting discussion of the historical conflicts and tensions between
practicing lawyers on one hand, and legal educators on the other hand, see generally W.
JOHNSON, SCHOOLED LAWYERs: A STUDY IN THE CLASH OF PROFESSIONAL CULTURES
(1978).
26 For example, recent articles have been written examining how Legal Formalism
might still serve to limit judicial discretion or judicial activism. See, e.g., Schauer,
Formalism, 97 YALE L.J. 509 (1988). Recent articles also question whether law is
essentially rational, as the Formalists believe, or essentially political, as the Functionalists
believe. Weinrib, Legal Formalis:On the Imminent Rationality ofLaw, 97 YALE L.J. 949
(1988).
Also, in conjunction with the political philosophy of the Ronald Reagan administration,
the theory of "original intent" as a theory of limited judicial interpretation has also been
propounded. See, e.g., Meese, The Supreme Court of the United States: Bulwark of a
Limited Constitution, 27 S. TEX. L. REv. 455 (1986); Scalia, Onginalism The Lesser Evil,
57 U. CN. L. REv. 849 (1989); see also J. AGRESTO, THE SUPREME COURT AND
CONsTrUrIONAL DEMOCRACY (1984); R. BORK, THE TEMIING OF AMERICA: THE
POLMrICAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAW (1990).
27 G. AICHELE, supra note 20, at x.
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And if there ever was any serious question that a judge's personal judicial philosophy is
not a crucial factor in his or her appointment to the bench, such a question has been
dispelled in the nomination hearings of Robert H. Bork to the United States Supreme Court:
Not since the equally intense confirmation fight over Justice Brandeis's nomination
to the high court [and arguably the Abe Fortas controversy during the Johnson
Administration] has legal theory been such an explicit factor in a jurist's selection ....
Judge Bork ultimately lost the fight, not because he was deemed professionally
incompetent or personally unfit, but because a very well organized opposition thought
him too capable an exponent of a politically unacceptable theory of judicial
interpretation. The recent nomination of Judge David Souter by President Bush to fill
the vacancy created by Justice Brennan's retirement suggests that presidents may begin
to choose judges without any known theoretical commitments rather than run the risk of
political controversy and ultimate confirmation defeat.

Id. at ix-x. The recent confirmation hearings of Supreme Court Associate Justice Clarence
Thomas, at least regarding his judicial philosophy, also demonstrate this important point.
See also R. BOPK, supra note 26, at 363:
Reagan's [Supreme Court] appointments . . . created a significant minority
opposed to political judging, and Bush appears determined to make that minority a
majority. He may succeed in his first term with the appointment of Justice David
Souter, and will certainly succeed if he is elected to a second. In that case, over half a
century of liberal policy-making by the judiciary will come to an end. The Supreme
Court will once more come to be, and be seen to be, a legal rather than a political
institution.
Accordingly, it will be interesting and instructive over the next few years to compare
the Rehnquist Court's judicial analysis and decisionmaking rationale against prior Supreme
Court decisions made by the Warren Court and the Burger Court. This author would
predict that the Rehnquist Court, utilizing a more Formalistic approach than its
predecessors, will give more deference to state and federal legislative action over judicial
discretion, as long as such legislation is not clearly unconstitutional.
See also Reuben, The Amazing Kozinski, 11 CALIF. LAW. 32, 33-36 (March, 1991):
Ever-colorful Alex Kozinski of the Ninth Circuit U.S. Court of Appeals, who five
years ago at age 35 became the youngest person appointed this century to the federal
appellate bench. Since then he has emerged as an original judicial thinker who
unabashedly admits he wants to "change the face of American jurisprudence." One of
the many young conservatives appointed by President Ronald Reagan to reshape the
federal judiciary, Kozinski may be working on his best move yet: appearing in the next
vacant seat on the U.S. Supreme Court ....
His rigorous opinions and playful style have won him an odd combination of
supporters. They range from liberals such as Santa Clara University Law School Dean
Gerald Uelmen, who praises Kozinski's "wonderful sensitivity for constitutional rights"
to such conservatives as failed Supreme Court nominee Robert Bork, who says, "He
and I tend to view things in the same general way."
Even Laurence Tribe of Harvard Law School, a patron saint of legal liberalism,
considers Kozinski "extremely intelligent and interesting, someone very much worth
watching .... "
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28
A resurgence in Legal Formalism can be found in the state courts as well.

Thus, as will be demonstrated below, despite the preeminence of Legal
Functionalism in other fields of American law, Legal Formalism continues to
exist as a viable rationale for judicial decisionmaking in insurance law, which is
largely based upon a traditional contractual interpretation of insurance policies

generally.
Whether or not one agrees with the philosophical tenets underlying Legal
Formalism or Legal Functionalism, one must still recognize and appreciate the
fact that these two conflicting legal theories continue to co-exist as uneasy
alternatives in American insurance law.
B. Legal Formalism versus Legal Functionalism in an Insurance Law

Context
As much as I have a distrust for government, [states Kozinski]
more distrust for the excessive discretion ofjudges.

. .

.I have even

28 A good example of this Formalist resurgence is found in the California Supreme
Court. Where once, under the Functionalist leadership of Chief Justice Roger Traynor, and
later under the Functionalist leadership of Chief Justice Rose Bird, the court "was unafraid
to lead the law into new and untracked areas," now, under the Formalist leadership of Chief
Justice Malcolm Lucas, the court "seems content to leave the leading to others." See, e.g.,
Blum, The CaliforniaSupreme Court: Toward a Radical Middle, 77 A.B.A. J. 48 (January,
1991).
Notice how the Lucas court has been described in classical Formalist terms:

mhe court has also expressed a preference for deferring policy judgments
affecting important social issues and commercial relationships to legislative decision
making. Some court watchers see this as a healthy return to the proper role of the court
as an interpreter, rather than a maker of law. Others . . . think the court is too
deferential ....
"In the area of the common law," says former Justice Grodin, "Ithink [the Lucas
court's] conservatism is reflected in the notion that it is unwise to expand liability, that
liability on the whole should be contracted, that contract principles should be applied
strictly and without regard, or with very little regard, for differences in bargaining
power between the parties, and in a tendency toward the insistence upon clear, bright
lines and rules."
Id. at50.
Other state courts have 'also either rejected, retracted, or limited their earlier
Functionalist approach regarding the interpretation of insurance contracts, and have adopted
more of a Formalist approach. See, e.g., Hallowell v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 443 A.2d
925 (Del. 1982); Casey v. Highlands Ins. Co., 100 Idaho 505, 600 P.2d 1387 (1979); Gene
& Harvey Builders, Inc. v. Pennsylvania Mfrs. Assn Ins. Co., 512 Pa. 420, 517 A.2d 910
(1986).
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It was more than fortuitous that two major proponents of Legal Formalism,
Christopher Columbus Langdel129 and Samuel Williston, 30 were also noted
authorities on the law of contracts 31 since American insurance law, to a very
32
large extent, is based upon principles of contract law.

Accordingly, Formalistic judicial interpretations of insurance policies are
still interpreted under the theory of strict contractual construction. For
example, in Brown v. Equitable Life Insurance Co. ,33 the Wisconsin Supreme
Court stated:
We think the theory of strict contractual construction of insurance contracts
followed by a majority ofjurisdictions is consistent with the philosophy of this
court.. . . Contracts of insurance rest upon and are controlled by the same
principles of law that are applicable to other contracts, and parties to an
insurance contract may provide such provisions as they deem proper as long as
34
the contract does not contravene law or public policy.
And although the Brown court was not happy that the insured was not
contractually entitled to coverage in this particular case, under a Legal
Formalist theory the court was powerless to rectify the situation:
It is not within the province of this court to determine what coverage, in its
good conscience, the life insurance industry should be required to offer ....
Nor is this court empowered by [state statute] to regulate and approve policies
of life insurance. That function is vested by the legislature in the office of the
Commissioner of Insurance. We do not have the power to create a new
contract for the parties. Thus, while we may not approve of such a sales device
as a conditional receipt and would like to see interim insurance afforded, we
are powerless to so legislate ....

35

29 See supra notes 7, 11-14 and accompanying text.
30 See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
31 See, e.g., C. LANGDELL, supra note 12; S. WILLISTON, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS

(1920). Williston was also the Reporter for the Restatement of the Law of Contracts (1928).
The Wflliston Treatise on the Law of Contracts continues to have an impact on the
present-day practice of contract law generally, and insurance law in particular. See, e.g., S.
WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS (W. Jaeger 3rd ed. 1957-1978, &

Supp. 1990). The Williston treatise currently is comprised of 18 substantive volumes and 3
volumes of forms.
32 "There are certain principles applying to the law of insurance which pertain to all
contracts alike, except for special forms regulated by statute." 1 J. APPLEMAN, INSURANCE
LAW & PRACrCE § 1 (1981); see also 1 C. COUCH, CYCLOPEDIA OF INSURANCE LAW §§
2:1, 2:12-2:13 (2d ed. 1984).
33 60 Wis. 2d 620, 211 N.W.2d 431 (1973).
34
Id. at 628, 211 N.W.2d at 435.
35 Id. at 630, 211 N.W.2d at 436; see also Grandpre v. Northwestern Nat'l Life Ins.
Co., 261 N.W.2d 804, 807 (S.D. 1977) (The insurance contract's language must be
construed according to its plain and ordinary meaning. It does not permit the court to make
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The rationale behind this Formalist theory of strict contractual construction
regarding insurance policies generally is found both in Williston's Treatise on
the Law of Contracts3 6 and in the Restatement of the Law of Contracts.37 For
example, in his treatise, Williston reiterates that:
Under the guise of interpretation, courts are repeatedly importuned to give a
meaning to the writing under consideration, which is not to be found in the
instrument itself, but which, is based entirely on direct evidence of intention.
And just as steadfastly, the courts reiterate the well-established principle that it
is not the function of the judiciary to change the obligations of a contract which
38
the parties have seen fit to make.

a forced construction or a new contract for the parties.); supra note 20 and accompanying
text.

36

See, e.g., 7 S. WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 900 (W.
Jaeger 3d ed. 1963): "Unless contrary to statute or public policy, a contract of insurance
will be enforced according to its terms"; see also 2 C. COUCH, supra note 32, at § 15:70;
13 J. APPLEMAN, supra note 32, at § 7402 (1976 rev. ed.).
37

See, e.g., RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF CONTRACr S§ 70 (1928), which states:

"One who makes a written offer which is accepted, or who manifests acceptance of the
terms of a writing which he should reasonably understand to be an offer or proposed
contract, is bound by the contract, though ignorant of the terms of the writing or its proper
interpretation."
Regarding the interpretation of contracts, see id. at §§ 227-30. Comment (a) to Section
230, for example, states that the words in a writing will be given the meaning that a
reasonably intelligent third person would give to them, even though such a meaning is not
one that would be anticipated by one party or the other. Comment (b) to Section 230 states
that is a contract has been integrated in writing by the parties, the contracting parties will be
deemed to have assented to the written words as a definite expression of their agreement.
38 4 S. WILLISTON, supra note 36, at § 610 (W. Jaeger 3d ed. 1961).
Numerous courts have continued to follow Williston's often-cited axiom. See, e.g.,
Drilling v. New York Life Ins. Co., 234 N.Y. 234, 137 N.E. 314 (1922) (a contract for
insurance is no different from any other contract, and the insurance company is therefore
entitled to have its contract enforced by the courts as written); LaPoint v. Richards, 66
Wash. 2d 585, 403 P.2d 889 (1965) (the existence of an insurance policy is a matter of
contract law, since insurance involves a contractual relationship between the insured and the
insurer); Duke v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 286 N.C. 244, 210 S.E.2d 187 (1974) (if the
language of an insurance policy is plain, unambiguous, and susceptible to only one
reasonable construction, the courts must enforce that contract according to its terms);
Showers v. Allstate Ins. Co., 136 Ga. App. 792, 222 S.E.2d 198 (Ga. Ct. App. 1975) (an
insurance policy, which by clear and unambiguous terms is limited in its coverage, will not
be so construed as to expand coverage beyond its stated terms); Transit Casualty Co. v.
Hartinan's Inc., 218 Va. 703, 239 S.E.2d 894 (1978) (a contract of insurance, as any other
contract, must be construed to give effect to the intention of the parties, if that intention can
be fairly determined from the instrument when read as a whole).
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Nevertheless, this Formalistic contractual approach to the interpretation of
insurance policies, while bringing uniformity and predictability into insurance
law disputes, still presents some serious problems.
Admittedly, an insurance company, in order to avoid unacceptable risks of
loss, may contractually limit such risks of loss. 3 9 But in order to achieve all
these protective ends
the insurance policy has become overloaded with warranties, representations,
conditions and exceptions, and other restrictive provisions, which tend to take
on highly technical and treacherous characteristics.... It has been often said
that if all the provisions of the modem insurance policy were literally enforced,
no policy holder could recover a penny. This is an overstatement, but
40
suggestive.

Thus, according to Professor Vance:
Policies become overgrown with a wilderness of warranties, many of the most
trivial character, in which the rights of the policyholder, however honest and
careful, were in grave danger of being lost. It was necessary for the courts to
go to the rescue of the public.... The unseemly struggle that ensued between
the unwise insurers who sought so to frame their policies as to compel the
courts to allow them the dishonest benefit of forfeitures unsuspected by the
insured, and the [Functionalist] courts who sought by liberal construction, and
sometimes distortion of the language of the policies, to do justice in spite of the
[policy language], resulted in a mass of litigation and confused precedent, the
41
likes of which cannot be found in any other field of our law.
In addition, there has been the argument advanced by various Functionalist
courts that standardized insurance contracts are not ordinary contracts
negotiated by parties with roughly equal bargaining power. Rather, they are
contracts of adhesion, in which the insurance company, in drafting a
standardized policy, has the superior bargaining position, and the insured has to
accept such a policy on a "take it or leave it"basis if he or she desires any form
of insurance protection. 42 For example, in the case of PrudentialInsurance Co.
v. Lamme43 the Nevada Supreme Court noted that:

39 See generally R. KEETON & A. WIDISS, supra note 3, at 460-608; W. VANCE,
HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF INSURANCE 364-427 (3d ed. 1951).

40 W. VANCE, CASES ON INSURANCE 211-12 (3d ed. 1940).
41 Vance, The History of the Development of the Warranty in Insurance Law, 20

YALE L.J. 523, 534 (1911).
42 Even Professor Williston, or his successor Professor Jaeger, recognized this serious
problem. See, e.g., 7 S. WILLISTON supra note 36, at § 900, page 19-20.
See also 7 S. Williston, supra note 36, at § 900:
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[Ain insurance policy is not an ordinary contract. It is a complex instrument,
unilaterally prepared, and seldom understood by the assured.... The parties
are not similarly situated. The company and its representatives are experts in
the field; the applicant is not. A court should not be unaware of this reality and
44
subordinate its significance to strict legal doctrine.

Accordingly, since the 1960s, a growing number of Functionalist courts
have utilized a result-oriented sociological approach 4 5 in insurance law
disputes, in order to protect the "reasonable expectations" of the insured
policyholder 46 from any possible forfeiture of coverage that might well occur
under a traditional Formalistic contractual analysis of insurance policies. 4 7
There are several characteristics of an insurance contract which set it apart from
the general run of contracts. Perhaps it is not too much to say that the courts are in the
process of creating a body of special rules to handle insurance cases and yet retain
insurance cases within the general framework of contract law.
See generally Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion-Some Thoughts About Freedom of
Contract, 43 COLuM. L. REv. 629 (1943); Rakoff, Contracts of Adhesion: An Essay in
Reconstruction, 96 HARV. L. REv. 1174 (1983).
43 83 Nev. 146, 425 P.2d 346 (1967).
44 Id. at 148-49, 425 P.2d at 347.
See also Allen v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 44 N.J. 294, 208 A.2d 638 (1965)
(similar holding); Gray v. Zurich Ins. Co., 65 Cal. 2d 263, 54 Cal. Rptr. 104, 419 P.2d
168 (1966) (A contract entered into between two parties of unequal bargaining strength,
expressed in language of a standardized contract, written by the more powerful bargainer to
meet its own needs, and offered to the weaker party on a "take it or leave it" basis carries
some consequences that extend beyond orthodox [Formalist contract analysis] implications);
Zuckerman v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 133 Ariz. 139, 650 P.2d 441 (1982) (An insurance
agreement is not a contract arrived at by negotiation between the parties. The insured is
given no choice regarding the terms and conditions of coverage, which the insured seldom
sees before purchase of the policy, which often are difficult to understand, and which
usually are neither read nor expected to be read by either party. This is not the traditional
method by which contracts, including insurance contracts, have been made.)
A Formalist reply to this argument, however, would be that standardized insurance
contracts are indispensible in conducting an insurance business in a mass society. See, e.g.,
Gowing v. Great Plains Mutual Ins. Co., 207 Kan. 78, 80, 483 P.2d 1072, 1075 (1971);
Estin Construction Co. v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 612 S.W.2d 413, 418 (Mo. App.
1981); see also Squires, A Skeptical Look at the Doctrine of Reasonable Expectations, 6
FORUM 252, 252-53 (1971); Birnbaum, Stahl, & West, StandardizedAgreements and the
ParolEvidence Rule: Defining and Applying the ExpectationsPrinciple, 26 ARIZ. L. REV.
793 (1984).
See generally Slawson, Standard Form Contracts and Democratic Control of
Lawnaking Power, 84 HARV. L. REV. 529 (1971).
45 See supra notes 15-19, 21-22 and accompanying text.
46 See generally Abraham, Judge-Made Law and Judge-Made Insurance: Honoring
the ReasonableExpectations of the Insured, 67 VA. L. REV. 1151 (1981); Henderson, The
Doctrine of Reasonable Expectations in Insurance Law After Two Decades, 51 OHIO ST.
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The major problem with this Functionalistic approach, however, is how the
policyholder's "reasonable expectations" to coverage under the insurance policy
should be defined and formulated. There is no problem, for example, under

both the Formalist and Functionalist approaches to insurance contract
interpretation whenever there are ambiguities within the policy. Under both
views, whenever the insurance contract is susceptible to two or more
reasonable interpretations, under the theory of contra proferentwn, the policy
will be strictly construed against the insurer who drafted the contract, and the

policy will be liberally construed in favor of the non-drafting party, the
insured. 48
The Functionalist dilemma develops, however, in defining the insured's
"reasonable expectations" to coverage under the insurance policy when such
"reasonable expectations" are at variance with the language in the insurance

policy itself And it is eminently clear that the Functionalist courts are not at all
uniform in how they approach this problem.
For example, as Professor Abraham succinctly writes:
The [Functionalist] courts have employed the [reasonable] expectations
principle in cases where the insured's expectation [of coverage] was probably

L.J. 823 (1990); Keeton, InsuranceLaw Rights at Variance with Policy Provisions (pts 1 &
2), 83 HARV. L. REv. 961, 1281 (1970); Keeton, Reasonable Expectations in the Second
Decade, 12 FoRUM 275 (1976); Rahdert, Reasonable Expectations Reconsidered, 18
CONN. L. REv. 323 (1986).
See also Comment, A Reasonable Approach to the Doctrine of Reasonable
Expectations as Applied to Insurance Contracts, 13 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 603 (1980);
Comment, InsurerLiability in the Asbestos Disease-ContextApplication ofthe Reasonable
ExpectationsDoctrine, 27 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 239 (1982); Note, Interpretingthe Business
PursuitsExclusion in Homeowners' Polides-TowardHonoring "ReasonableExpectations,"
25 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 132 (1980); Comment, The Reconstruction of Insurance Contracts
Under the Doctrine ofReasonable Expectations, 18 J.MARSHALL L.REV. 155 (1984).
47 See supra notes 32-36 and accompanying text.
48 See, e.g., Gaunt v. John Hancock Life Ins. Co., 160 F.2d 599 (2d Cir. 1947)
(applying Conn. law); Goucher v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 113 R.I. 672, 324
A.2d 657 (1974); see also 13 J.APPLEMAN, supra note 32, at § 7401; 2 C. COUCH, supra
note 32, at § 15:74; R. JERRY, supra note 9, at 94-98; R. KEETON & A. WIDISS, supra
note 3, at 628-30.
RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 236(d) (1932) provides: "Where words or other
manifestations of intention bear more than one reasonable meaning an interpretation is
preferred which operates more strongly against the party from whom they proceed, unless
their use by him is prescribed by law."
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 206 (1979) also carries forward the
substance of former Sec. 236(d) in this manner: "In choosing among the reasonable
meanings of a promise or agreement or term thereof, that meaning is generally preferred
which operates against the party who supplies the words or from whom a writing otherwise
proceeds."
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real and reasonable. 49 They have also employed it where an expectation of
coverage was less probable, but the policy's denial of coverage seemed
unfair. 50 Finally, they have relied on the principle even where an expectation
of coverage was improbable and the denial of coverage would not appear
judicial concept of an "expectation" of
unfair. 5 1 In short, the [Functionalist]
52
coverage is not a monolithic one.

The Restatement (Second) of Contracts arguably also incorporates this
Functionalist "reasonable expectations" view into its Section 211. 53 The most
49 Abraham, supranote 46, at 1153 (citing as an example, Kievet v. Loyal Protective
Life Ins. Co., 34 N.J. 475, 170 A.2d 22 (1961)).
50 Id. (citing as an example, Smith v. Westland Life Ins. Co., 15 Cal. 3d 111, 539
P.2d 433, 123 Cal. Rptr. 649 (1975)).
51 Id. (citing as an example, Gray v. Zurich Ins. Co., 65 Cal. 2d 263, 419 P.2d 168,
54 Cal. Rptr. 104 (1966)).
52 Id.
"The courts,"writes Professor Abraham, "are [now] beginning to articulate the reasons
underlying their ['reasonable expectations'] decisions," since prior to the 1960s, the casual
observer often could find "little doctrinal support for such decisions other than the maxim
that an instrument is to be construed against its drafter. Often courts even seem to search for
an ambiguity to construe against the insurer. It is easy to conclude that this simply reflects
an unprincipled preference for the policyholder at the expense of the deep-pocketed insurer,
contrary policy provisions notwithstanding."Id. at 1151.
See also a two-page advertisement, appearing simultaneously in TIME magazine,
March 11, 1991, and NEWSWEEK magazine, March 11, 1991, by American International
Group (AIG), describing itself as "the largest underwriter of commercial and industrial
insurance in America, and the leading U.S. based international insurance organization,"
stating that "[wle must reform our 'deep pockets' approach to liability," and urging readers
to contact their legislators to support a legislative 'reform' of this "liability crisis."
53 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACrs § 211 (1981).
Comment (b) to Section 211 states:
A party who makes regular use of a standardized form of agreement does not
ordinarily expect his customers to understand or even to read the standard terms ....
Customers do not in fact ordinarily understand or even read the standard terms. They
trust to the good faith of the party using the form and to the tacit representation that like
terms are being accepted regularly by others similarly situated. But they understand that
they are assenting to the terms not read or understood, subject to such limitations as the
law may impose.
Comment (e) to Section 211 states in part: "Apart from government regulation, courts
in construing and applying a standardized contract seek to effectuate the reasonable
"There is no
expectations of the average member of the public who accepts it ....
comparable section in the FirstRestatement of Contracts.
According to Professor Jerry, "[olnly one court has relied upon section 211 of the
Restatennt (Second)of Contracts in the insurance setting [citing Darner Motor Sales, Inc.
v. Universal Underwriters Ins. Co., 140 Ariz. 383, 682 P.2d 388 (1984)], but section 211
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extreme application of a Functionalist "reasonable expectations" test, however,
is found in a formula propounded by Professor (now Judge) Robert Keeton in
an influential 1970 Harvard Law Review article. He states: "The objectively
reasonable expectations of [insurance] applicants and intended beneficiaries

regarding the terms of insurance contracts will be honored even though
painstaking study of the policy provisions would have negated those

expectations. "54
The crucial factor here is that, under Professor Keeton's Functionalist
"reasonable expectations"formula, the insurance policy need not be read at all,
55
which is anathema to a Formalist theory of insurance contract interpretation.
Since 1970, the Keeton "reasonable expectations" formula has enjoyed
substantial acceptance and support from various commentators 56 and has been

adopted by a number of Functionalist courts. 57 In recent years, however, this
can be expected to attain greater prominence in future years." R. JERRY, supra note 9, at
100.
Professor Henderson writes, however, that the Arizona Supreme Court may have gone
beyond the Restatement's requirements in the case of Gordinier v. Aetna Casualty & Sur.
Co., 154 Ariz. 266, 742 P.2d 277 (1987); see also C & J Fertilizer Inc. v. Allied Mut. Ins.
Co., 227 N.W.2d 169 (Iowa 1975). A good discussion of Section 211 is found in
Henderson, supra note 46, at 844-53.
54 Keeton, Insurance Lav Rights at Variance with Policy Provisions 83 HARV. L.
REV. 961, 963-64 (1970). The second part of the Keeton formula was that "an insurer
should be denied any unconscionable advantage in an insurance contract." Id.
55
mhe Keeton formula suggests that an insured can have reasonable expectations of
coverage that arise from some source other than the policy language itself, and that
such an extrinsic expectation can be powerful enough to override any policy provisions
no matter how clear. So interpreted, the Keeton formula pushes insurance law in a
dramatic new direction, one that discards the traditional [Formalist] contract premise
that a written agreement is the controlling code for determining the parties' rights and
duties.
Rahdert, supra note 46, at 335.
Compare the majority Functionalist opinion in Collister v. Nationwide Life Ins. Co.,
479 Pa. 579, 594, 388 A.2d 1346, 1353 (1978) ("The reasonable expectation of the insured
is the focal point of an insurance transaction .... Courts should be concerned with assuring
that the insurance purchasing public's reasonable expectations are fulfilled.") with the
minority Formalist dissent ("[Tihe problem in deciding an insurance claim seems no longer
to be one of ascertaining what .the contract as written means, but somehow divining the
'reasonable expectation' of the insured as to what the contract should mean."). Id. at 600,
388 A.2d at 1357; see also supra notes 30-36 and accompanying text.
56 See, e.g., authorities cited in note 46 supra.
57 See, e.g., Lambert v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 331 So. 2d 260 (Ala. 1976); Puritan
Life Ins. Co. v. Guess, 598 P.2d 900 (Alaska, 1979); Zuckerman v. Transamerica Ins. Co.,
133 Ariz. 139, 650 P.2d 441 (1982); C. & J.Fertilizer Inc. v. Allied Mutual Ins. Co., 227
N.W.2d 169 (Iowa, 1975); Brown v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 427 So. 2d 139 (Miss.
1983); Transamerica Ins. Co. v. Royle, 202 Mont. 173, 656 P.2d 820 (1983).
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Functionalist doctrine of "reasonable expectation" has come under increasing
criticism from other commentators, 58 and the doctrine has been rejected by a

number of Formalist courts:

59

According to Professor Henderson, the following states have adopted the Keeton
"reasonable expectations" doctrine: Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, California, Iowa, Montana,
Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, and New Jersey. Henderson, supra note 46, at 828.
Another six jurisdictions may, or may not, have adopted the Keeton "reasonable
expectations" doctrine, but "the decisions from these six jurisdictions are not entirely free
from ambiguity themselves and require analysis:" Colorado, Delaware, Hawaii, North
Carolina, Pennsylvania, and Rhode Island. Id. at 829-34.
58 See, e.g., Note, Reasonable Expectations: The Insurer's Dilemma, 24 DRAKE L.
REV. 853, 863 (1975) ("It is questionable whether such a marked departure from the
traditional contract rule is warranted."); Comment, A Reasonable Approach to the Doctrine
ofReasonable Expectationsas Applied to Insurance Contracts, 13 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 603,
617 (1980) ("the bargain courts protect under the Keeton analysis may be neither in the
contract nor indicated by surrounding circumstances.").
See also Anderson, Reasonable Expectations and Insurance Contracts: What Should
We Reasonably Expect from Judges?, 28 FOR THE DEFENSE 9 (April, 1986); Birnbaum,
Stahl, & West, supra note 44; Gardner, Reasonable Expectations: Evolution Completed or
Revolution Begun?, 669 INS. L.J. 573 (1978); Squires, supra note 44, at 252; Comment,
InsuranceLaw Insurance ContractInterpretation:Doctrine of Reasonable ExpectationsHas
No Place in Illinois, 1985 S. ILL. L.J. 687 (1985); Note, A Comon Law Alternative to the
Doctrine ofReasonable Expectationsin the Construction of Insurance Contracts, 57 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 1175 (1982); Note, The Reconstru-con of Insurance Contracts Under the Doctrine
ofReasonable Expectations, 18 J. MARSHALLL. REV. 155 (1984); Comment, A Critique of
the Reasonable Expectations Doctrine,56 U. CHL. L. REV. 1461 (1989).
And see Rahdert, supra note 46, at 335:
IThe Keeton formula gives no hint at what factors other than the policy provisions
courts might use to define the 'terms"of the insurance arrangement, or how the courts
are to measure the force of these external factors against the force of restrictive policy
provisions to determine which should prevail in any given instance.
59 See, e.g., Hallowell v. State Farm Ins. Co., 443 A.2d 925 (Del. 1982); Meckert v.
Transamerica Ins. Co., 108 Idaho 597, 701 P.2d 217 (1985); Menke v. Country Mut. Ins.
Co., 78 IM.2d 420, 36 Ill. Dec. 698, 401 N.E.2d 539 (1980); Bond Bros. v. Robinson, 393
Mass. 546, 471 N.E.2d 1332 (1984); Robbins Auto Parts Inc. v. Granite State Ins. Co., 121
N.H. 760, 435 A.2d 507 (1981); Walle Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sweeney, 419 N.W.2d 176 (N.D.
1988); Sterling Merchandise Co. v. Hartford Ins. Co., 30 Ohio App. 3d 131, 506 N.E.2d
1192 (1986); Ryan v. Harrison, 40 Wash. App. 395, 699 P.2d 230 (1985); St. Paul Fire &
Marine Ins. Co. v. Albany County School Dist., 763 P.2d 1255 (Wyo. 1988); see also
Gene & Harvey Builders, Inc. v. Pennsylvania Mfrs. Ass'n Ins. Co., 512 Pa. 420, 517
A.2d 910 (1986).
According to Professor Henderson, a number of jurisdictions have rejected the Keeton
"reasonable expectations" doctrine, including: Idaho, Illinois, Massachusetts, North Dakota,
Ohio, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Washington, and Wyoming. Henderson, supra note 46,
at 834-35. At least 25 other states have not expressly adopted, nor expressly rejected, the
Keeton doctrine of "reasonable expectations" either because the courts have not really
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Remarkably, for a doctrine initially so popular, there are signs that its appeal is
beginning to fade. Courts in a growing number of jurisdictions have
announced limits on the doctrine's sway, while others that initially led the
advance have begun to march in retreat. What has happened in the courts has
been paralleled in the literature, where some commentators of late have
challenged the doctrine's validity or called for narrowing reformulations. In
short, the doctrine of reasonable expectations seems to have come half-circle in
a matter of approximately twenty-five years. By no means has it passed from
the scene, but the ardor of the early apostles seems to have given way rather
60
quickly to the doubting of skeptics.

Four commentators, however, stress that the Functionalist doctrine of

"reasonable expectations," although plagued in the past with serious problems
of uncertainty

and

unpredictability

in its judicial

application,

should

nevertheless continue to be utilized as a useful and viable doctrine in the

interpretation of insurance contracts, as long as this "reasonable expectations"
doctrine is augmented and buttressed with additional clearly defined rules and

procedures in order to ensure a more uniform and a more predictable judicial
application.

61

But although the "reasonable expectations" doctrine continues to enjoy
support from many academic scholars, and although it continues to enjoy
support from various Functionalist courts, a Formalist judge would counter this
addressed the issue, or because it is not clear whether the doctrine would be utilized in the

absence of any policy ambiguity. Id. at 835-38. A majority of state courts, therefore, have
not to date expressly adopted the Keeton doctrine of "reasonable expectations"; and
although Professor Henderson states that "one may predict with considerable confidence
that courts in [these] jurisdictions will recognize these developments and that any confusion
over the nature of the ['reasonable expectations'] doctrine itself will rapidly dissipate," id. at
838, this author cannot as easily accept Professor Henderson's optimistic prediction, at least
in the foreseeable future, based upon the apparent resurgence of present-day Legal
Formalism.
60 Rahdert, supra note 46, at 324; see also Henderson, supra note 46, at 824, 837-38:
[E]ven after two decades, there still seems to exist a great deal of uncertainty as to
the doctrinal content and when the [reasonable expectations] principle may be invoked,
including most of the jurisdictions that have professed to have adopted it. In short,
questions remain as to whether the principle has developed into a full-fledged doctrine
which can be applied in a predictable and evenhanded manner by the courts ....
Although the number of adoptions [of the doctrine of reasonable expectations] is
impressive, one may also conclude from [other cases] . . . that there remains some
ambivalence towards adopting the doctrine ....
61 See, e.g., Abraham, Judge-Made Law and Judge-Made Insurance: Honoring the
Reasonable Expectations of the Insured, 67 VA. L. REV. 1151 (1981); Henderson, supra
note 46; Mayhew, Reasonable Expectations: Seeking a Principled Application, 13
PEPPERDINE L. REv. 267 (1986); Rahdert, supra note 46.
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argument by stating that any alleged unfairness in the insurance contract should

be rectified, not through discretionary judicial action, but rather through the
administrative action of the state insurance commissioner, who possesses

properly delegated authority from the state legislature to approve or disapprove
of all insurance policies contracted within that state. Under this Formalist
philosophy, then, any alleged unfairness in the insurance policy should be

rectified, not by the court, but by the state insurance commissioner whenever
the insurance policy does not comply with the state insurance code or whenever
62
the policy contains misleading provisions, clauses, or titles.
62 See, e.g., Brown v. Equitable Life Ins. Co., 60 Wis. 2d 620, 630, 211 N.W.2d
431, 436 (1973) ("[Tjhis court is [not] empowered by [state statute] to regulate and approve
policies of life insurance. That function is vested by the legislature in the office of the
Commissioner of Insurance. We do not have the power to create a new contract for the
parties."); Kirk v. Financial See. Life Ins. Co., 75 Ill. 2d 367, 374, 376, 389 N.E.2d 144,
146, 148 (1978) ("The legislature has not been silent on the matter of public policy as it
relates to the contents of insurance policies. The Director of the Department of Insurance is
required by statute to review policies of insurance in certain categories and approve or
disapprove them, based on criteria including the established public policy of the State ....
The approval of... policies of insurance by the Department, although not conclusive upon
the courts, is, however, entitled to great weight .... ");
Formisano v. Blue Cross, 478 A.2d
167, 170, 171 (R.I. 1984) ("The Legislature has the constitutional authority to prescribe
conditions under which an insurance company shall transact business within our state, and
concomitantly it has the power to delegate to the [state insurance commissioner] the
authority to issue rules and regulations governing the content of insurance contracts .... .").
See also PATrERSON, THE INSURANCE COMMISSIONER IN THE UNrrED STATES
(1927). Kimball, The Purposeof Insurance Regulation:A PreliminaryInquiry in the Theory
of InsuranceLaw, 45 MINN. L. REV. 471, 523 (1961), states, in pertinent part:
While protection of the weaker of two contracting parties explains the intervention
of the state in the insurance transaction, it does not explain the myriad forms taken by
that intervention . . . . Once [state] intervention has begun, new purposes begin to
emerge, and the goals of reasonableness, equity, and fairness become explicit. Finally,
as the insurance enterprise becomes more and more crucial to the social fabric and as
regulation acquires more sophistication, the manifold purposes of society at large come
to have more and more implications for the processes of insurance regulation.
See also Kimball & Pfennigstorf, Legislative and JudicialControl of the Ters of Insurance
Contracts: A Comparative Study of American and European Practice, 39 IND. L.J. 675
(1964); Kimball & Pfennigstorf, Administrative Control of the Terms of Insurance
Contracts,40 IND. L.J. 143 (1965); Kimball, Book Review, 19 CONN. L. REV. 311 (1987)
(critical of the "reasonable expectations" doctrine).
The Formalists, therefore, also believe in reasonableness, equity, and fairness in
insurance contracts. But they differ from the Functionalists as to which branch of
government should have primary responsibility in regulating and reforming the insurance
industry in general, and in regulating and reforming insurance policies in particular. The
Formalists would favor legislative and administrative action in this area, and judicial
restraint rather than judicial discretionary action.
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Thus, irrespective of the particular merits and weaknesses of a Formalist
approach or a Functionalist approach to American insurance law, one must
nevertheless understand and appreciate the fact that both theories of American

jurisprudence co-exist today in an uneasy, conflicting, and often confusing
relationship within the overall framework of insurance law.
I1. SPECIFIC EXAMPLES OF THE FORMALIST-FUNCTIONALIST
DICHOTOMY IN AMERICAN INSURANCE LAW

Although the selected insurance law topics discussed below do not purport
to be an exhaustive treatment covering every aspect of the FormalistFunctionalist insurance law dichotomy, these .four examples nevertheless do
serve as important illustrations of how this Formalist-Functionalist
jurisprudential dichotomy continues to exist in an uneasy and conflicting
framework in American insurance law today.

A. Insurance ContractAmbiguity versus "Constructive"Ambiguity versus
No Ambiguity at All
Under general rules of contract interpretation, whenever the insurance
policy is susceptible to two or more reasonable interpretations so that an
ambiguity exists, under the doctrine of contraproferentum the insurance policy
will be strictly construed against the insurer who drafted the contract, and the
policy will be liberally construed in favor of the insured who was the nondrafting party. 63 On this general rule of insurance contract interpretation, both
the Formalist courts and the Functionalist courts can readily agree. 6 4 A
Arguably too, current state regulation of the insurance industry is more comprehensive
and more effective than state regulation that existed in Professor Vance's day. See, e.g.,

supra notes 40-41 and accompanying text.
63 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACrs § 236(d) (1932); RESTATEMENr
(SECOND) OF CONTRACrS § 206 (1981). See also sources cited supra note 48 and
accompanying text.
64 See, e.g., Hartnett v. Southern Ins. Co., 181 So. 2d 524, 528 (Fla. 1965) ("[S]o
long as [insurance] policies are drawn in such a manner that it requires the proverbial
Philadelphia lawyer to comprehend the terms embodied in it, the courts should and will
construe them liberally in favor of the insured and strictly against the insurer to protect the
buying public who rely upon [insurers] and agencies in such transactions."). See also the
extensive compilation of insurance law cases cited in support of this well-accepted rule of
contractual construction of ambiguities appearing in 2 C. COUCH, supra note 32
§§ 15:74-15:78 (2d ed. 1984 & 1990 Corn. Supp.);.13 J. APPLEMAN, supra note 32 § 7401
(rev. ed. 1976 and 1990 Supp.).
Moreover, the important corollary to this general rule is that:
When the rmsurance] contract is clear, precise, and unambiguous in its terms, and
the sense is manifest and leads to nothing absurd, there is no proper scope for a resort
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problem, however, arises for most Formalist judges when various Functionalist
judges, purportedly in order to justify the insured's expectation of coverage,
attempt to find a so-called "constructive" ambiguity in an insurance policy,
65
when no such ambiguity exists in fact.
So under this Formalist-Functionalist clash, the question remains: is such
a judicial practice of finding "constructive" ambiguities in insurance policies
socially defensible, or is it logically and philosophically dishonest? For
example, the Formalist courts and Functionalist courts are deeply divided

regarding the interpretation of "conditional receipt" coverages regarding life and
accident insurance policies, specifically when the prospective insured dies after
submitting his or her insurance application and first premium payment, but
before the final insurance policy is delivered to the applicant. 66 Although the

vast majority of jurisdictions continue to interpret such "conditional receipts"
according to the clear and unambiguous language appearing within the
insurance application itself, and thus provide coverage to such applicants only

to rules of construction, even to give effect to the policy. If the express terms and
language that the parties have used is not ambiguous or uncertain, it should be given
effect as written.
2 C. CoucH, supra note 32, § 15:70 (2d ed. 1984 & Com. Supp. 1990) (emphasis added);
see also 13 J. APPLEMAN, supra note 32, § 7402 ("[This rule does not justify abandoning
principles of normal interpretation where the [insurance] contract is clear, or taking such'a
construction as would vary the true meaning of the contract and the intention of the

parties.").

65 Even Professor Keeton states that "[tjo extend the principle of resolving ambiguities
against the draftsman in this fictional way not only causes confusion and uncertainty about
the effective scope of judicial regulation of contract terms but also creates an impression of
unprincipled judicial prejudice against insurers."Keeton, InsuranceLaw Rights at Variance
with Policy Provisions,83 HARV. L. REV. 961, 972 (1970).
See also Abraham, Judge-Made Law and Judge-Made Insurance: Honoring the
Reasonable Expectations ofthe Insured, 67 VA. L. REV. 1151, 1154 (1981) ("by sometimes
finding ambiguities where none apparently existed, courts have avoided explaining why an
insured's expectations, even though reasonable, should override the language of the
policy.'); Rahdert, Reasonable ExpectationsReconsidered, 18 CONN. L. REv. 323, 327-33

(1986).
66 For a good discussion of the various legal theories involving "conditional receipt"
insurance disputes, see Hildebrand v. Franklin Life Ins. Co., 118 IMl.App. 3d 861, 455

N.E.2d 553 (1983). See also Anderson, Life Insurance Conditional Receipts and Judicial
Intervention, 63 MARQ. L. REv. 593 (1980); Note, "Binding Receipts"in California, 7
STAN. L. REV. 292 (1955); Note, Life Insurance Policies and "Binding Receipts". Is the
Insurer Bound?, 1968 UTAH L. REV. 448 (1968); Note, Life Insurance Receipts: The
Mystery of the Non-Binding Binder, 63 YALE L.J. 523 (1954).
See also Annotation, Temporary Life, Accident, and Health Insurance Pending
Approval ofApplication or Issuance ofPolicy, 2 A.L.R.2d 943 (1948).
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if they are found to be acceptable risks as of the underwriting date,6 7 a minority
of Functionalist courts have held that such "conditional receipts" constitute
temporary insurance, by utilizing a "constructive" ambiguity argument in the
68
absence of any actual ambiguity.
Not surprisingly, this "constructive" ambiguity rationale in insurance
contract interpretation has received severe criticism from various Formalist
courts, For example, in Brown v. Equitable Life Insurance Co.,69 the
Wisconsin Supreme Court noted that:
The appellant would have us apply that which one court has called the doctrine
of "constructive ambiguity"...70 [which has been applied in] subsequent
cases. 7 1 Under such a doctrine, the court would avail itself of a fictional

ambiguity so as to provide a basis upon which the court could legislate
72
coverage under a conditional receipt. We refuse to do so.

Quoting an earlier decision from the Oregon Supreme Court, 73 the Brown court
continued:

67

See Hildebrand v. Franklin Life Ins. Co., 118 I. App. 3d 861, 455 N.E.2d 553

(1983).
The most commonly used form of conditional receipt is the "satisfaction" or
"insurability" type of conditional receipt, which means the insurer must be satisfied that the
prospective insured was otherwise insurable as a standard risk at the time of the application.
A more traditional minority approach is the "approval" type of conditional receipt,
which means no insurance coverage comes into effect until the insurance is approved by an
authorized official of the insurer. If it does come into effect, however, the effective date of
the policy is that of the application or the medical examination.
See, e.g., Gaunt v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 160 F.2d 599 (2d Cir. 1947),
cert. denied, 331 U.S. 849 (1947); Hildebrand v. Franklin Life Ins. Co., 118 Ill.
App. 3d
861, 455 N.E.2d 553 (1983).
68 This theory of "temporary" insurance, based upon a "constructive" ambiguity
insurance contract interpretation, generally requires that the insurer cannot terminate its
coverage unless the insured is notified during his or her lifetime that his or her insurance
application was rejected. See, e.g., Smith v. Westland Life Ins. Co., 15 Cal. 3d 111, 539
P.2d 433, 123 Cal. Rptr. 649 (1975); Slobojan v. Western Travelers Life Ins. Co., 70 Cal.
2d 432, 450 P.2d 271, 74 Cal. Rptr. 895 (1969); Ransom v. Penn Mut. Life Ins. Co., 43
Cal. 2d 420, 274 P.2d 633 (1954); Law v. Hawaiian Life Ins. Co., 51 Haw. 288, 459 P.2d
195 (1969); Service v. Pyramid Life Ins. Co., 201 Kan. 196, 440 P.2d 944 (1968); Allen v.
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 44 N.J. 294, 208 A.2d 638 (1965); Prudential Ins. Co. of Am.
v. Lamme, 83 Nev. 146, 425 P.2d 346 (1967).
69 60 Wis. 2d 620, 211 N.W.2d 431 (1973).
70 Citing Ransom v. Penn Mut. Life Ins. Co., 43 Cal. 2d 420, 274 P.2d 633 (1954).
71 See cases cited supra note 68 and accompanying text.
72
Brown, 60 Wis. 2d at 629, 211 N.W.2d at 436.
73 Morgan v. State Farm Life Ins. Co., 240 Or. 113, 116-17, 400 P.2d 223, 224
(1965) (citations omitted).
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Admittedly there have been cases in which a theory of constructive ambiguity
has been employed in the absence of any ambiguity .... 74 Nevertheless, we
are unable to decide the case at bar on a basis of a fiction which we deem
inapplicable. The literal meaning of the [conditional] receipt in this case is that
the insurer engaged to insure the insured if he turned out to be insurable, and,
in that event, the insurance would be in effect from the date of the application.
Such contracts have not yet been declared to be illegal in this state.
Accordingly, this is the contract the parties made, and we are not at liberty to
75
create a new contract for the parties.

Indeed, various commentators who are strong proponents of the
Functionalist "reasonable expectations" theory in insurance law7 6 also have

been disturbed by this "constructive" ambiguity analysis 77 and, in practice, the
vast majority of American courts have refused to recognize such a
78
"constructive" ambiguity argument.
A better approach, at least for modem Functionalist courts, would be to
openly and expressly embrace the "reasonable expectations" doctrine as a

legitimate legal theory, 79 rather than attempting to judicially justify some
hidden agenda by espousing an intellectually and philosophically unsound
argument based upon the questionable doctrine of a "constructive' ambiguity. 80
74 Oting Ransom v. Penn Mut. Life Ins, Co., 43 Cal. 2d 420, 274 P.2d 633 (1954).
75 Brown, 60 Wis. 2d at 629, 211 N.W.2d at 436.
76 See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
77 See supranotes 52 & 65 and accompanying text.
78 See, e.g., 2 C. COUCH, supra note 32 § 15:86:
Merely because contracts of insurance are to be construed against the insurer or
merely because the contract itself is one of insurance does not warrant the creation of
doubt through construction of plain and unambiguous provisions of a contract. A doubt
which would not be tolerated in any other kind of contract will not be created in
insurance cases where the language in the policy is too clear and unambiguous to leave
room for doubt. Resort is not to be had to a strained construction for the purpose of
recognizing an ambiguity not otherwise apparent so that the court may have the liberty
of applying the rule of construction against the insurer [citing many cases in support of
this Formalist proposition].
79 See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
80 See, e.g., Henderson, supra note 46, at 846-53; Rahdert, supranote 46, at 325-33;
Note, Insurance as Contract: The Argunent for Abandoning the Ambiguity Doctrine, 88
COLUM. L. REV. 1849 (1988).
For example, in Gordinier v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 154 Ariz. 266, 742 P.2d 277
(1987), a wife who was not living in the same household with her husband at the time of the
accident attempted to collect uninsured motorists' benefits under an insurance policy that
required that the wife reside in her husband's household. Even in the absence of any
ambiguity or "constructive" ambiguity in the policy language, the Arizona Supreme Court
held that such a restriction to coverage might nevertheless be unenforceable under the
"reasonable expectations" doctrine "[w]here the contract terms, although not ambiguous to
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A Formalist court, however, would still continue to apply traditional rules of
insurance contract interpretation, and would still continue to reject the
"constructive" ambiguity argument, as well as the "reasonable expectations"
8
doctrine. '
B. Insurance Contract Provisions in Violation of State Public Policy:

Who Decides?
The general rule of traditional insurance law contract interpretation is that
in the absence of ambiguity, the courts have no authority to alter or change the
plain meaning of an insurance contract under the guise of contract
interpretation, and the courts must therefore give effect to the provisions of a

valid insurance contract that is otherwise not prohibited by law.82 But
whenever an insurance contract is contrary to state public policy, it is illegal
and void.8 3 The test of whether or not an insurance contract is void as against
state public policy is whether it is injurious to the public or contravenes some
important established societal interest, or when its purpose is to promote,
84
effect, or encourage a violation of law.

the court, cannot be understood by the reasonably intelligent consumer... [then] the court
will interpret them in light of the objective, reasonable expectations of the average
insured..."or "[w]here some activity reasonably attributable to the insurer has induced a
particular insured reasonably to believe that he [or she] has coverage, although such
coverage is expressly and unambiguously denied by the policy .... " Id. at 272-73, 742
P.2d at 283-84.
See also Darner Motor Sales, Inc. v. Universal Underwriters Ins. Co., 140 Ariz. 383,
682 P.2d 388 (1984), in which the Arizona Supreme Court followed the lead of the Iowa
Supreme Court in C & I Fertilizer, Inc. v. Allied Mut. Ins. Co., 227 N.W.2d 169 (Iowa
1975), in not only adopting the "reasonable expectation" doctrine, but also in adopting what
was to later become Section 211 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts (1981). See
generally supra note 53 and accompanying text. But see Comment, Decapitationto Cure
Dandruff? The Scope of the Reasonable Expectations Doctrine of DarnerMotor Sales Inc.
v. Universal UnderwritersIns. Co., 20 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 841 (1988).
81 See, e.g., supra notes 38, 62, & 78 and accompanying text; see also Anderson,
Life Insurance Conditional Receipts and Judicial Intervention, 63 MARQ. L. REV. 593
(1980); Comment, Reasonable Expectations: ContractAmbiguity vs. Arbitrary Application,
34 DRAKEL. REV. 1065 (1985-86).
82 See, e.g., Sibley v. Bankers Life & Casualty Co., 213 So. 2d 59 (La. App. 1968);
see also supra notes 36-38 and accompanying text. See generally 2 C. COUCH, supra note
32 § 15:38 and the extensive number of cases cited therein.
83 See, e.g., L'Orange v. Medical Protective Co., 394 F.2d 57 (6th Cir. 1968)
(applying Ohio law); Boston Ins. Co. v. Read, 166 F.2d 551 (10th Cir. 1948) (applying
Okla. law); Concord Gen. Mut. Ins. Co. v. McLain, 270 A.2d 362 (Me. 1970). See
generally 12 J. APPLEMAN, supra note 32 § 7027 (1981); 9 C. COUCH, supra note 32
§ 39:14 (2d ed. 1985).
84 See, e.g., L'Orange v. Medical Protective Co., 394 F.2d 57 (6th Cir. 1968)
(applying Ohio law).
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The question then arises as to who should decide whether or not an
insurance contract violates state public policy-the state legislatures or the
courts?
Traditionally, state public policy is normally expressed through the state
legislature, and through the legislature's duly authorized administrative agency,
the state insurance commission, since a state has a valid legal right to regulate
and control the business of insurance for the public good.8 5 Various courts,
however, have also held that an insurance policy may be void because it
violates not only statutorily declared public policy, but also because it violates a
public policy that the courts would enforce in the absence of any statutory
authority. For example, some Functionalist courts have relied on state public
policy grounds to override nonambiguous, explicit terms in an insurance
contract whenever the contract terms would arguably operate to defeat the
"reasonable expectations" of the insured.8 6 Bit other Formalist courts would
reiterate that any seemingly harsh contractual result against an insured should
not justify public policy "meddling" by the Functionalist courts in the absence
of clearly stated legislative or administrative guidelines. 87
There are many examples of insurance law cases illustrating how this
Formalist-Functionalist dichotomy operates within the public policy context
affecting insurance law generally. But among these many examples, the
controversy involving time limitations for accidental death benefits in life
insurance contracts serves as a prime example of this Formalist-Functionalist
public policy disparity.
For example, in the case of Burne v. The Franklin Life Insurance Co., 88
the insured, Bartholomew Burne, had a life insurance policy that contained a
double indemnity payment provision if the insured's death was accidental, and
if "such death occurred.., within ninety days from the date of the accident."89
This policy provision was clear, express, and unambiguous. On January 30,
1959, Mr. Burne was struck by an automobile while crossing a street in North
Miami, Florida. With vast sums of money and sophisticated medical
techniques, Mr. Burne was kept medically alive, albeit in a persistent
85 See, e.g., California State Auto. Ass'n Inter-Ins. Bureau v. Maloney, 341 U.S. 105
(1951); Eckenrode v. Life of Am. Ins. Co., 470 F.2d 1 (7th Cir. 1972) (applying M. law);
Swanco Ins. Co. v. Hager, 879 F.2d 353 (8th Cir. 1989) (applying Iowa law), cert. denied,
110 S. Ct. 866 (1990); Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Daddy$ Money, Inc., 646 S.W.2d 255
(1ex. App. 1982); see also supra note 62 and accompanying text. See generally 2A C.
COUCH, supra note 32, §§ 21:1-21:14 & 21:24-21:104 (2d ed. 1985).
86 See, e.g., Sands v. Granite Mut. Ins. Co., 232 Pa. Super. 70, 331 A.2d 711

(1974).
87 See, e.g., Putnam v. New Amsterdam Casualty Co., 48 I. 2d 71, 269 N.E.2d 97
(1970).
88 451 Pa. 218, 301 A.2d 799 (1973).
89 Id. at 221, 301 A.2d at 801 (quoting decedent's life insurance policy).
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vegetative state, for four and a half more years. 90 So although his death in fact
was accidental, Mr. Burne clearly did not die within the specified ninety day
period that was required in his insurance policy in order for his beneficiary to
receive a double indemnity payment.
Nevertheless, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that Mr. Burne's
beneficiary was entitled to an accidental death double indemnity payment, since
the ninety day accidental death policy provision was held to be against
Pennsylvania's strong public policy. The court stated:
There are strong public policy reasons which militate against the
enforceability of the ninety day limitation. The provision has its origins at a
much earlier state of medicine .... Physicians and surgeons now stand at the
very citadel of death, possessing the awesome responsibility of sometimes
deciding whether and what measure should be used to prolong, even though
momentarily, an individual's life. The legal and ethical issues attending such

deliberations are gravely complex.
The result reached by the trial court [granting summary judgment in favor
of the insurer, based upon the unambiguous insurance policy language]
presents a gruesome paradox indeed- it would permit double indemnity
recovery for the death of an accident victim who dies instantly or within ninety
days of an accident, but would deny such recovery for the death of an accident

victim who endures the agony of prolonged illness, suffers longer, and
necessitates greater expense by his family in hopes of sustaining life even
momentarily beyond the ninety day period. To predicate liability under a life
insurance policy upon death occurring only on or prior to a specific date, while
denying policy recovery if death occurs after that fixed date, offends the basic
concepts and fundamental objectives of life insurance and is contrary to public
91
policy. Hence, the ninety-day limitation is unenforceable.

90 Id.
91 Id. at 221-22, 301 A.2d at 801-02.
The Burne court went on to state:
mhe decisions as to what medical treatment should be accorded an accident victim
should be unhampered by considerations which might have a tendency to encourage
something less than the maximum medical care on penalty of financial loss if such care
succeeds in extending life beyond the 90th day. All such factors should, whenever
possible, be removed from the antiseptic halls of the hospital. Rejection of the arbitrary
90-day provision does exactly that.
Id. at 223, 301 A.2d at 802.
This rationale might also be germane to various "right to die" cases-involving surrogate
medical decision making. Conpare, for example, the judicial rationale in In re Quinlan, 70
N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647 (1976), cert. denied sub nom., Garger v. New Jersey, 429 U.S. 922
(1976), with Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d 408 (Mo. 1988), aft'd, 110 S. Ct. 2841
(1990).
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Other Functionalist courts have likewise held, as did the Burne court, that
a ninety-day provision for accidental death benefits in a life insurance policy is

92
unenforceable as contrary to state public policy.
However, a Formalist court in the subsequent case of Kirk v. Financial
Security Life Insurance Co., 93 severely criticized the Burne rationale, and

expressly declined to follow it. 94 In Kirk, the insured died 92 days after the

accident, and the double indemnity provision of his life insurance policy took
effect only if the insured died within 90 days of the accident. The Illinois
Supreme Court in this case ruled in favor of the insurance company, holding
that such an unambiguous ninety-day provision in the life insurance contract
did not violate state public policy. 95 The Illinois Supreme Court reasoned in
Kirk:
The long line of authority supporting these time-limitations requirements

in insurance policies, the recent departure from these holdings by the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Burne and the New Jersey appellate court in
Karl, and the subsequent rejection of Burne by the Ohio Supreme Court and
the Louisiana appellate court indicate that the issue is not one where there are
clearly defined and objective rules and standards of public policy. This is not a
matter where public policy is so clear that objective criteria compel us to hold
the 90-day limitation invalid. Furthermore, public policy of a State or the

nation is found imbedded in its constitution and its statutes, and, when these
are silent on a subject, in the decisions of the courts [citations omitted]. The
legislature has not been silent on the matter of public policy as it relates to the
contents of insurance policies. The Director of the Department of Insurance is

required by statute to review policies of insurance in certain categories and
approve or disapprove them, based on criteria including the established public
policy of this State ....
The approval of the use of 90-day limitation periods in policies of
insurance by the Department, although not conclusive on the courts, is,
92 See, e.g., Karl v. New York Life Ins. Co., 139 N.J. Super. 318, 353 A.2d 564
(1976), aft'd, 154 N.J. Super. 182, 381 A.2d 62 (App. Div. 1977); see also Note, Death Be
Not Proud-7heDemise of Double Indemnity Rine Limitations, 23 DEPAuL L. REv. 854
(1974).
93 75 IM.2d 367, 389 N.E.2d 144 (1978).
94 The Kirk court noted that two other courts had also rejected the Burne rationale,
and had upheld the traditional 90-day accidental death limitations. See, e.g., Rhoades v.
Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y of U.S., 54 Ohio St.2d 45, 374 N.E.2d 643 (1978);
Fontenot v. New York Life Ins. Co., 357 So. 2d 1185 (La. App. 1978).
95 The Kirk court stated that it was following the traditional Formalist rule recognized
in the vast majority ofjurisdictions, citing more than 25 cases in support of its holding, and
Annotation, Validity and Construction of Provision in Accident Insurance Policy Limiting
Coveragefor DeathsorLoss ofMember to Death orLoss Occurring Within Specified Period
After Accident, 39 A.L.R.3d 1311 (1971). 1A J. APPLEMAN, supra note 32 § 612 (1965).
Kirk, 75111. 2d at 371-72, 389 N.E.2d at 145-46.

HeinOnline -- 52 Ohio St. L.J. 1065 1991

1066

OHIO STATE LAW JOURVAL

[Vol. 52:1037

however, entitled to great weight as against the contention that such a provision
is against public policy ....
That this 90-day provision is a matter best left to the legislature and
Department of Insurance is clear from an analysis of the issues
involved ....96

So, again, we observe how some Functionalist courts, in order to validate

the "reasonable expectations" of the insured, actively utilize judicial discretion
97
under the rubric of a public policy argument to achieve. their ultimate goal.
Formalist courts, on the other hand, when faced with a similar public policy
issue, continue to utilize judicial restraint in deference to state constitutional,

statutory, and administrative guidelines and continue to espouse a traditional
98
contractual interpretation applied to insurance contracts generally.

C. Loss %rising Out of the Ownership, Maintenance or Use" of an
Automobile: What CausalNexus Is Required?
In a standard personal automobile insurance policy, liability insurance
coverage generally is afforded to the insured or to any other "covered person"
for any loss arising out of "the ownership, maintenance or use" of such
automobile. 99 But how should such a loss "arising out of the ownership,
maintenance or use"of the automobile be interpreted by the courts? 100 Again, a

96 Kirk, 75 M1.2d at 374-77, 389 N.E.2d at 147-48.
97
See generally Note, Death Be Not Proud- 77e Demise of Double Indemnity 7hne
Limitations, 23 DEPAuL L. REV. 854 (1974) (supporting this Functionalist approach).
98 See generally Note, The Role of Public Policy and Reasonable Expectations in
Construing Insurance Contracts, 47 TEMPLE L.Q. 748 (1974) (supporting this Formalist
approach).
99 See, e.g., Insurance Services Office, Sample Personal Automobile Insurance
Policy, Insuring Agreement Part A, Section 1 (1983).
100 For an overview of this important subject, see generally 12 C. COUCH, supra note
32, at § 45:53-45:80 (2d ed. 1981); 7A J.APPLEMAN, supra note 32, at § 4500 (1979);
Annotation, Automobile Liability Insurance: What Are Accidents or Injuries 'Arising Out of
Ownership, Maintenance, or Use"of Insured Vehicle, 15 A.L.R.4th 10 (1982).
It should also be noted that loss arising out of the "ownership, maintenance or use" of a
vehicle, while expressly included in most automobile insurance policies, is expressly
excluded in most homeowner insurance policies. Thus, very often this legal question of
interpretation hinges on whether the automobile insurer or the homeowners insurer is
ultimately liable to the insured. See, e.g., State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Kohl, 131
Cal. App. 3d 1031, 182 Cal. Rptr. 720 (1982); National Am. Ins. Co. v. Insurance Co. of
N. Am., 74 Cal. App. 3d 565, 140 Cal. Rptr. 828 (1977); Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v.
Evans, 7 Kan. App. 2d 60, 637 P.2d 491 (1981); Waseca Mut. Ins. Co. v. Noska, 331
N.W.2d 917 (Minn. 1983); Farmers Fire Ins. Co. v. Kingsbury, 118 Misc. 2d 735, 461
N.Y.S.2d 226 (1983).
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divergence of Formalist and Functionalist courts becomes apparent in this area
of insurance law as well.
Although some courts have applied a severely restricted interpretation of
the word "use" of an automobile to mean the actual "operation" of such a
vehicle, or the manipulation of the automobile's controls in order to propel
it,101 most other courts have not applied such a strict interpretative standard. A
majority of these courts have held that the "use" of an automobile is not
necessarily synonymous with "driving"or "operating"the vehicle, and therefore
it is sufficient to show only that the accident "was connected with," "grew out
of," or "flowed from" the use of the automobile.10 2 All courts, however,
uniformly agree that a causal connection or causal nexus must exist between the
injury or loss on one hand, and the ownership, maintenance, or use of the
automobile on the other hand, in order to comply with the insurance policy
coverage provision for loss "arising out of the ownership, maintenance or use"
of the automobile.10 3
But the important distinction between many Formalist and Functionalist
courts is the degree of this causal connection that is required between the loss
and the "use" of the automobile. Put another way, the courts have differed
regarding whether a substantial causal nexus is required under the insurance
policy, or merely a minimal or sufficient causal nexus.
Although the courts are far from uniform in how they interpret this causal
nexus requirement, it is submitted that those courts applying a more
Formalistic approach to automobile insurance policy disputes tend to require a
substantial causal connection between the injury and the "use" of the
automobile, largely based upon traditional priniciples of insurance contract
interpretation. Those courts that apply a more Functionalistic approach to
automobile insurance disputes, based upon the insured's "reasonable
101 See, e.g., Richland Knox Mut. Ins. Co. v. Kallen, 376 F.2d 360 (6th Cir. 1967).
102 See, e.g., Brenner v. Aetna Ins. Co., 8 Ariz. App. 272, 445 P.2d 474 (1968);
Hogle v. Hogle, 167 Conn. 572, 356 A.2d 172 (1975); Cagle v. Playland Amusement,
Inc., 202 So. 2d 396 (La. App. 1967); Progressive Casualty Ins. Co. v. Hoekman, 359

N.W.2d 685 (Minn. App. 1984); State Farm Mut. Ins. Co. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 154 W. Va.
448, 175 S.E.2d 478 (1970).
103 See, e.g., Unigard Mut. Ins. Co. v. Abbott, 732 F.2d 1414 (9th Cir. 1984)
(applying Mont. law); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Smith, 107 Idaho 674, 691 P.2d
1289 (Idaho App. 1984); Chicago Ins. Co. v. Security Ins. Co., 111 N.J. Super. 291, 268
A.2d 296 (1970); Plaxco v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 252 S.C. 437, 166 S.E.2d

799 (1969).
However, a break in the chain of causation, where the injury results from an
independent, superceding cause, generally would not arise out of the ownership,

maintenance, or use of the automobile. See, e.g., State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Kohl,
131 Cal. App. 3d 1031, 182 Cal. Rptr. 720 (1982); Carter v. City Parish Government, 409
So. 2d 345 (La. App.) cert. denied in part,412 So. 2d 1114 (La. 1981), rev'd in part, 423

So. 2d 1080 (La. 1982).
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expectation" of coverage, are not as concerned with traditional contractual
implications as the Formalist courts are, and therefore require only a minimal
or sufficient causal nexus to find coverage under the policy.
For example, in the case of Lumberman's Mutual Casualty Co. v.

Logan,104 a New York appellate court refused to find that the insurance
company was liable for an accident "arising out of the ownership, maintenance
or usen of an automobile where the injury resulted from the insured's fall in an
icy automobile parking lot. The New York court reasoned that since the
accident did not arise from the intrinsic nature of the automobile, and the
vehicle itself did not produce the injury, there was no substantial causal nexus
between the injury and the "use" of the automobile to allow coverage under the
policy. 10 5 A number of other Formalist courts also have utilized this substantial
10 6
causal nexus standard.
In Novak v. Government Employees Insurance Co.,107 however, a Florida
appellate court held that where the insured, while leaving her house, was shot

by an assailant in her driveway after she refused his request to give him a ride,
the insured's injury and subsequent death did arise "out of the ownership,

maintenance or use" of the automobile. The court reasoned that the insured's
automobile need not be the instrumentality of the injury, nor must the type of
conduct that caused the injury be foreseeably identifiable with the normal use of
the automobile. Thus, since a direct causal connection was not required in the
104 88 App. Div. 2d 971, 451 N.Y.S.2d 804 (1982).
105 Id. at 971, 451 N.Y.S.2d at 805.
106 In addition to requiring a substantial causal nexus between the injury and the "use"
of the automobile, courts applying this Formalist-based rationale also try to determine
whether or not the automobile was "used"in a "normal"manner. See, e.g., Carter v. Graih
Dealers Mut. Ins. Co., 10 Ark. App. 16, 660 S.W.2d 952 (1983) (there must be a causal
connection between the injury and the operation of the automobile, so being shot while
sitting inside an automobile is not enough, since the victim could as easily have been shot
outside the vehicle as well); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Smith, 107 Idaho 674, 691
P.2d 1289 (Idaho App. 1984) (an automobile insurance policy provision requiring an injury
to "arise out of the use" of the automobile connotes a substantial causal nexus between the
injury and use, and this causal nexus must be more than an incidental or fortuitous nexus);
United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Western Fire Ins. Co., 450 S.W.2d 491 (Ky. 1970)
(an accident has to arise out of the inherent nature of the automobile in order to bring it
within the terms of the policy "use"provision); Coleman v. Sanford, 521 So. 2d 876 (Miss.
1988) (similar holding to the Cartercase, supra); Nassau Ins. Co. v. Jiminez, 116 Misc. 2d
908, 456 N.Y.S.2d 654 (1982) (there was no substantial causal nexus between the injury
and the "use" of the vehicle, because the vehicle was not the actual instrumentality that
produced the injuries); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Powell, 227 Va. 492, 318 S.E.2d
393 (1984)" (even though the "ownership, maintenance or use"of an automobile need not be
the direct and proximate cause of the injury in a legal sense, there still must be a causal
connection between the accident and the employment of the insured motor vehicle as a
motor vehicle in order for coverage to exist).
107 424 So. 2d 178 (Fla. App. 1983).
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legal sense, only a minimal causal nexus was necessary.' 08 A number of other
10 9
Functionalist courts also have utilized this minimal causal nexus standard.
The courts are also split on the question of whether injuries sustained when

a firearms weapon accidentally discharges while being loaded in, or unloaded
from, a vehicle arises out of the "use" of such a vehicle. Again, those courts
requiring a substantial causal nexus with the "use" of the automobile generally
deny coverage, 110 while those courts requiring only a minimal causal nexus
with the "use" of the automobile generally find that coverage exists. 111
108 Id. at 180-81.
109 See, e.g., Wyoming Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins.
Co., 467 F.2d 990 (10th Cir. 1972) (applying Wyo. law) (for an accident to be regarded as
one resulting from the "use" of a vehicle, the. causal relationship needs only to be
"sufficiently connected"to the act); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Gillespie, 455 So. 2d 617 (Fla. App.
1984) (the causal nexus between the injury and the automobile "use" need not be
substantial); North Am. Ins. Co. v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 74 Cal. App. 3d 565, 140
Cal. Rptr. 828 (1977) (only a minimal causal connection is required between the injury and
"use" of the automobile, and since coverage for accidents arising out of the "use" of an
automobile has a broad and comprehensive meaning, almost any causal connection between
the automobile and the injury will provide coverage); Government Employees Ins. Co. v.
Batcheler, 421 So. 2d 59 (Fla. App. 1982) ("some connection" or "nexus" is all that is
legally required between the injury and "use" of the automobile); Waseca Mut. Ins. Co. v.
Noska, 331 N.W.2d 917 (Minn. 1983) (the phrase "arising out of the use"of an automobile
requires only "some"causal connection between the injury and the use of the vehicle).
110 See, e.g., Bruno v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 337 So. 2d 241 (La. App.
1976); Shinabarger v. Citizens Mut. Ins. Co., 90 Mich. App. 307, 282 N.W.2d 301 (1979).
III See, e.g., Traveler's Ins. Co. v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 491 S.W.2d 363
(renn. 1973); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Truck Ins. Exch., 63 Wis. 2d 148, 216 N.W.2d 205
(1974); see also State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Smith, 107 Idaho 674, 675-76, 691 P.2d
1289, 1290-91, which states:
The Missouri Court of Appeals recently reviewed and categorized the decisions
determining coverage under a use provision when an accidental shooting occurs in the
proximity of a vehicle. Cameron Mutual Insurance Company v. Ward, 599 S.W.2d 13
(Mo. App. 1980). The first category involves "= the accidental discharge of guns inside
moving or motionless vehicles while an occupant of the vehicle is handling or toying
with the gun.. . ." The Missouri Court found, without exception, the cases in this
category disallow coverage under the insuring agreements because no causal
connection exists between the discharge of the guns and the use of the vehicles. The
vehicles were merely the situs of the injuries since discharge of the guns was
unconnected with the inherent use of the vehicle.
The Missouri Court's second category of cases involves "the accidental discharge
of guns during the process of loading them into or unloading them from vehicles."
These cases hold that coverage exists under the insurance policies. The third category
involves the use of a physical portion of a vehicle as a "gun rest" for the purpose of
firing a weapon. The three decisions reviewed by the Missouri Court in this category
split in their determination regarding coverage. The fourth category involves the
"accidental discharge of guns resting in or being removed from gun racks permanently
attached to vehicles."The cases in this category usually find that coverage exists. The
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Accordingly, a wide- divergence still exists between Judicial Formalists and
Judicial Fuctionalists in this important area of automobile insurance law.

D. Comprehensive or Commercial General Liability Insurance

Coverage: Interpretating the

Pollution Exclusion Clause for

EnvironmentalLosses
One of the greatest challenges facing the American liability insurance
industry today deals with the major threat of pollution-related environmental
liability.1 12 Such liability may be based upon the federal Comprehensive

113
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act ("CERCLA"),
or liability also may be based upon other state and federal pollution statutes, or

upon state common law principles such as nuisance.114 In the wake of this
pollution-related litigation explosion, many manufacturers and other
commercial enterprises have sought to shift the financial burden of these
pollution liability claims onto their insurance companies under their
comprehensive general liability insurance policies (now called commercial
general liability insurance policies), or CGL policies for short. 15 The liability
insurance companies, however, in order to avoid these pollution liability
claims, have drafted and incorporated pollution exclusion clauses into their
16
CGL insurance policies.1

fifth category involves "the accidental discharge of guns inside a vehicle caused by the
actual movement or operation of the vehicle." The cases reviewed by the court in this
category find a sufficient causal connection between the use of the vehicle and the
injury to invoke coverage under the use provision of the liability policy.
112

See, e.g., The American Law Institute, Complex Litigation ProjectTentative Draft

No. 1 at page 17 (1989) (identifies pollution insurance coverage disputes as the paradigms
of modem complex litigation which may well require new management and adjudicative
techniques). See generally Abraham, Environmental Liability and the Liats of Insurance,
88 COLuM. L. REV. 942 (1988).
113 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1988).
114 See, e.g., New Jersey Dept. of Envtl. Protection v. Ventron Corp., 94 N.J. 473,
468 A.2d 150, 19 E.R.C. 1505 (1983).
115 See, e.g., Westinghouse Corp. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 233 N.J. Super. 463, 559
A.2d 435 (1989), in which Westinghouse Corporation sought, in a single action, a
declaration of coverage rights with respect to all their pollution liability claims under
hundreds of CGL policies issued over a 40 to 50 year period.
116 A pollution exclusion clause generally provides that coverage that may otherwise
exist under a CGL policy does not apply to claims based on:
[Blodily injury or property damage resulting from the discharge, dispersal, release
or escape of smoke, vapors, soot, fumes, acids, alkalis, toxic chemicals, liquids or
gases, waste materials or other irritants, contaminants or pollutants into or upon land,
the atmosphere or any mater course or body of water; but this exclusion does not apply
if such discharge, dispersal, release or escape is sudden or accidental.
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According to one commentator, the liability insurance companies devised
these pollution exclusion clauses:
to exclude all pollution coverage for pollution-related liability claims except
those claims arising from causative events that fit within the traditional, pre-

1966 concept of "accident."That is, the general exclusion for pollution liability
claims was expressly made subject to a narrow exception for claims resulting
from polluting discharges that are both fortuitous, unexpected and unintended"accidental'L- and non-recurrent, abrupt and isolated in time, or truly
"sudden."

117

Various Functionalist courts, however, have not interpreted the pollution
exclusion clause in this manner. These Functionalist courts, in order to validate
the "reasonable expectations" of the insured policyholders, have held that the
"sudden and accidental" exception to the pollution exclusion clause is
ambiguous,"18 and therefore the pollution exclusion clause should be construed
to have no independent meaning at all, since it is simply a "restatement" of the
policy "occurence" clause, with its limitation of coverage based only upon
injuries or damages that are either expected or intended from the standpoint of
the insured.1 19

Standard CGL Exclusion Clause, Insurance Services Office, 1973. See generally Ballard &
Manus, CearingMuddy Waters: Anatomy of the Comprehensive GeneralLiability Pollution
Exclusion, 75 CORNELL L. REV. 610 (1990); Note, The Pollution Exclusion aause
7hrough the Looking Glass, 74 GEORGETOWN L.J. 1237 (1986); Russell, Developments in
Insurance Coveragefor EnvironmentalLosses-The Pollution Exclusion, Paper delivered to
the Insurance Law Section of the Association of American Law Schools in Washington
D.C. on January 6, 1991; Marrs, PollutionExclusions Validity and Applicability, 26 TORT
& INs. L.J. 662 (1991).
117 Russell, supra note 116, at 8.
For the policyholders' perspective regarding the pollution exclusion's "drafting
history,"however, see contra Sayler & Zolensky, Pollution Coverage and the Intent of the
CGL Drafters: The Effect of living Backvards, MEALEY'S LMGATION REPORTS
(INsURANCE), Vol. 2 at 4425 (1986).

But for a case that supports the insurers' interpretation of-the pollution exclusion's
"drafting history,"see American Motorists Ins. Co. v. General Host Corp., 120 F.R.D. 129
(D. Kan. 1988).
118 See, e.g., Claussen v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 259 Ga. 333, 380 S.E.2d 686
(1989); Jackson Township Mun. Util. Auth. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 186 N.J.
Super. 156, 451 A.2d 990 (1982) (because the term "sudden" is ambiguous, the pollution
exclusion clause does not preclude coverage when an intentional discharge results in
unintended harm).
119 See, e.g., Jackson Township Mun. Util. Auth. v. Hartford Accident & Indem.
Co., 186 N.J. Super. 156, 164, 451 A.2d 990, 992 (1982), in which the court held that the
CGL pollution exclusion clause :
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But recently, a number of Formalist courts have taken serious issue with
this Functionalist interpretation of the pollution exclusion clause in CGL
policies and have held that since the pollution exclusion provision and its

"sudden and accidental" exception are not ambiguous, 120 the courts must

12 1
interpret and apply the "everyday meaning"of the pollution exclusion clause,
rather than attempting to utilize some Functionalist rationale in order to find
policyholder coverage that is at variance with the clear and unambiguous terms
i
of the CGL insurance policy exclusion. 22

can be interpreted as simply a restatement of the definition of "occurrence'--that is, that
the [CGL] policy will cover claims where the injury was "neither expected nor
intended" [by the insured]. It is a re-affirmation of the principle that coverage will not be
provided for intended results of intentional acts but will be provided for the unintended
results of an intentional act.
See also New Castle County v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 673 F. Supp. 135

(D.Del. 1987); Claussen v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 259 Ga. 333, 380 S.E.2d 686
(1989); Jonesville Prod. Co. v. Transamerica Ins. Group, 156 Mich. App. 508, 402
N.W.2d 46 (1986); DuWel Products, Inc. v. United States Fire Ins. Co., 236 N.J. Super.
349, 565 A.2d 1113 (App. Div. 1989), cert. denied, 121 N.J. 617, 583 A.2d 316 (1990);
Just v. Land Reclamation, Ltd., 155 W'is. 2d 737, 456 N.W.2d 570 (1990).
120 See, e.g., United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Star Fire Coals, Inc., 856 F.2d 31
(6th Cir. 1988) (applying Ky. law) ("We fully agree with the conclusion that this language is
clear and plain, something only a lawyer's ingenuity could make ambiguous."); Technicon
Elecs. Corp. v. American Home Assurance Co., 141 App. Div. 124, 533 N.Y.S.2d 91
(1988), aft'd, 74 N.Y.2d 66, 542 N.E.2d 1048, 544 N.Y.S.2d 531 (1989).
121 See, e.g., United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Star Fire Coals, Inc., 856 F.2d
31, 34 (6th Cir. 1988) (applying Ky. law):
We have no difficulty reconciling the [pollution exclusion clause with the CGL
policy "occurrence" provision]. We believe the "occurrence" definition results in a
policy that provides coverage for continuous or repeated exposure to conditions causing
damages in all cases except those involving pollution, where coverage is limited to
those situations where the dischargewas "sudden and accidental."...
We believe that the everyday meaning of the term "sudden" is exactly what this
clause means . . . .It must also be emphasized that the focus of this "sudden and
accidental"exception to the general pollution exclusion is on the nature of the discharge
not on the nature of the damages caused.
of the pollution itself,
We believe that the phrase "sudden and accidental" is not a synonym for
"unexpected and unintended,"and that it should not be defined by reference to whether
the accident or damages were expected.
122 The resurgence of this Formalist rationale, involving a traditional contractual
interpretation of pollution exclusion clauses in CGL policies, is illustrated in the following
cases: International Minerals & Chem. Corp. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 168 ll1. App. 3d
Dec. 96, 522 N.E.2d 758 (1988); Lumbermens Mut. Casualty Co. v.
361, 119 Ill.
Belleville Indus., Inc., 407 Mass. 675, 555 N.E.2d 568 (1990); Ray Indus., Inc. v. Liberty
Mut. Ins. Co., 728 F. Supp. 1310 (E.D. Mich. 1989); Technicon Elecs. Co. v. American
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Thus, again, with this final illustration of pollution exclusion clauses in
CGL insurance policies, not only is there strong evidence of a FormalistFunctionalist dichotomy in the way these pollution exclusion clauses are
interpreted by the courts, but there is also strong evidence of a surprising
resurgence in the Formalist judicial philosophy of applying a traditional
contractual interpretation to insurance contracts generally, and to
comprehensive or commercial general liability insurance contracts in particular.
IV. CONCLUSION

Seemingly arbitrary and contradictory decisional patterns in American
insurance law cases can be understood and appreciated only if one recognizes
the fundamental impact- and clash- of two competing theories of American
jurisprudence, Legal Formalism and Legal Functionalism, in an insurance law
context.
Legal Formalism is based upon a traditional view that correct legal
decisions are determined by pre-existing legal rules, and that the courts must
reach their decisions in a logical and socially neutral manner. Formalist judges
therefore generally apply the philosophy of judicial restraint, in favor of
established legislative and.administrative authority.
In an insurance law context, Legal Formalism is exemplified by the
writings of Professor Samuel Williston and others who believe that insurance
contracts ought to be judicially interpreted under the same legal principles as
contracts in general, with the exception of various insurance forms and
procedures that are regulated by statute.
Legal Functionalism, on the other hand,, is based upon a modern view that
the paramount concern of the courts should not be logical consistency, as the
Formalists believe, but socially desirable consequences. Functionalist judges
therefore generally apply the philosophy of judicial activism, co-equal to
legislative or administrative authority.
In an insurance law context, Legal Functionalism is exemplified by the
writings of Professor Robert Keeton and others who believe that the
"reasonable expectations" of the insured ought to be honored, even though a

Home Assurance Co., 141 App. Div. 124, 533 N.Y.S.2d 91 (1988) aff'd 74 N.Y.2d 66,
542 N.E.2d 1048, 544 N.Y.S.2d 531 (1989); Waste Management, Inc. v. Peerless Ins. Co.,
315 N.C. 688, 340 S.E.2d 374 (1986); Centennial Ins. Co. v. Lumbermens Mut. Casualty
Co., 677 F. Supp. 342 (E.D. Pa. 1987).
In order to avoid future litigation in this complex area of insurance law, the liability
insurance industry in 1986 drafted and incorporated a new "absolute" pollution exclusion
clause into their new Commercial General Liability Insurance Policy. See generally
Hendrick & Wiezel, The New Connercial General Liability Forns: An Introduction and
Citique, 36 FED. INS. & CoRP. CouNs. Q. 319 (1986).
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painstaking study of the insurance policy provisions contractually would negate
those expectations.
Although Legal Functionalism is widely recognized as the dominant legal
theory of jurisprudence in most areas of American law today, Legal Formalism
has nevertheless maintained continuing theoretical credibility with many courts
in the field of insurance law, primarily based upon a traditional contractual
interpretation of insurance policies in general.
Thus, Legal Formalism today is far from a dead issue, at least in an
insurance law context, and may in fact be in a resurgence, while Legal
Functionalism, as exemplified by the insurance law doctrine of "reasonable
expectations," may be experiencing a more limited judicial application than
various commentators had initially predicted.
So whether one agrees with the philosophical tenents underlying Legal
Formalism or Legal Functionalism in an insurance law context, one must still
recognize and appreciate the fact that both of these conflicting theories continue
to co-exist as uneasy alternatives in American insurance law today.
It is not enough, therefore, to understand insurance law "in the books" and
insurance law "in action." One must also know the judge- and understand the
jurisprudential philosophy of each particular court.
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